Threat to the Crown: How the Pilgramage of Grace Compromised Henry VIII

The Pilgrimage of Grace of 1536 is a major uprising which, paradoxically, could be viewed to have both threatened and subsequently weakened Henry and his regime- and posed no threat, and strengthened the monarchy.

The Pilgrimage of Grace is a large-scale rebellion which posed as a substantial threat to Henry and his regime. All three sources, written by Peter Marshall (1), Conrad Russell (2) and Richard Rex (3) support this view, whether that’s minimally or substantially. Argued as being the biggest rebellion to have taken place in Tudor England (2) the uprising undoubtedly posed as a threat, with no amount of propaganda achieving to diffuse the situation (1). Acting as a series of linked rebellions (1), the most notable of which being the Lincoln, York (later named the Pilgrimage of Grace by leader, Robert Aske) and Cumberland uprisings, the threat grew in size. The initial gathering of rebels alone stood strong with 10,000 supporters in Lincolnshire, murdering the Chancellor of Bishop of Lincoln and outnumbering the opposing force ¼. The number of supporters grew, and by the Pilgrimage of Grace led by Aske, the rebels stood 30,000 strong- compared to Norfolk's 8,000 troops upon meeting at Pontefract. With no personal army, Henry needed time to call upon his nobles to raise forces- a factor which, if the rebels had been attacking with the sole intention to usurp Henry, would have been deadly. This lack of instant military support leaves Henry vulnerable, and allows the rebellion to pose as a threat much easier. Conrad Russell (2) argues the only reason the rebellion “failed” was due to the geographical locations of the uprisings being too far from London to cause major impact. Taking this into account, Henry’s regime would have been under much higher of a threat if it were occurring in the capital- within the monarch’s stronghold of London, impossible to sweep aside and ignore.

All three historians support the idea the threat of the rebels was the motivation behind Henry becoming reclusive and open to listening to their grievances. Offering the rebels a pardon (2) demonstrates the fact Henry must have been feeling threatened- attempting to diffuse the situation, pushing his ego aside, despite the Pontefract Articles clear discontent to Henry's regime and almost 20 years worth of political and religious policy. Russell believes the Pilgrimage of Grace was driven by an attachment to the old was in religion (2), a view supported further by historians such as John Guy and Christopher Haigh. This view is further supported by demands in the Pontefract Articles for the restoration of the monasteries, alongside the rebels carrying banners of the 5 wounds of Christ, and moreover the name of the rebellion itself- containing religious terminology. The idea that the vast majority of rebels were Catholic and Aragonese poses a threat to Henry VIII- and comes across as a stroke of luck that it didn’t come to a battle (1) with the possibility of those rebels being killed dying as martyrs, dying for their religious beliefs; not a position Henry and his regime want to be in, existing as a Protestant state surrounded by Catholic domains- France, Ireland, Spain- and most substantially, the Holy Roman Empire (HRE). Highly Catholic, and related to the beloved Catherine of Aragon, the HRE’s disposable army which could be dispatched at any given moment, was greater in numbers than the population of the entire of England. This clear tension and threat of international support, alongside the obvious outnumbering of troops from both outside powers and that of the rebels, poses the Pilgrimage of Grace as a major threat to Henry and his regime.

However, it can also be viewed the Pilgrimage of Grace didn’t pose a major threat to Henry and his regime. Starkey argues the entire rebellion was a scare tactic, a threat with no depth or body behind it. If this was the case, and was noted by Henry, the threat becomes noticeably less threatening- supported by Henry’s ease to entertain Aske, and continuation to dissolve monasteries throughout the period, despite the Pontefract Articles outlining this as a grievance. Source 2 mentions the geographical location of the uprisings. This geographical location posed as an advantage to Henry- and, as Loades explains, Henry exploits this situation the make his position in the North stronger than it had ever been before. He did this by taking Northumberlands inheritance and title, by appointing gentry- William Eure- as warden of the East March and creating the Council of the North; uniting the North, and decreasing powers of the possible over mighty and beloved noble family, the Percies. The adaption to policies in this area of the country, after rebellions which demonstrated such content towards change, illustrates how minor of a threat Henry must have viewed the Pilgrimage of Grace to be.

Source 2 further believes Henry only drew back to manipulate the situation, and bide more time0 the rebels belief in the king's pardon alone demonstrates his success in the English Reformation and Tudor regime (3). The rebels believed Henry was one of them- conservative in religion and politics alike. This naivety of the rebels and strategic move by Henry demonstrates his unshaken status. The Tudors “made the monarchy essential to the continuation of the social order” and subsequently, the country relied heavily on the monarch. For this reason, it’s safe to say a rebellion this large didn’t have intentions to overthrow or usurp the king, posing less of a threat to Henry and his security. This is further demonstrated in source 3 as Rex explains how revolutionary politics of the 1530’s were Henry’s, and to reverse them, you had to remove Henry himself from the throne. This explains why other factors were advertised for the motives behind the rebels, such as the removal of “evil advisors” (Cromwell and Riche) who should be “punished as subverters of the good laws of the realm”. With no clear motive, and with the motivations behind the rebellions still being disputed between historians today, the rebellion posed less of a threat to Henry and his regime, as it appears unorganised- and easily manipulated, as proved by Aske returning to York in 1537 as a vocal supporter of Henry. By early may fifteen of the main leaders were under arrest (despite the promise of a pardon) and by the end of 1537, Norfolk had executed around 215 activists, including those of high gentry status such as Lord Darcey and Hussey. The ease to defeat the activists supports the view the Pilgrimage was not a major threat to Henry VIII and his regime.

The Pilgrimage of Grace had many successes and failures, but in conclusion, it can most be predominantly viewed as a failure- then supporting the view that the Pilgrimage of Grace was not a major threat to Henry, Despite arguably being the greatest internal threat to Henry across the entirety of his reign, the strategic way in which Henry dealt with it demonstrates his unshaken state, unthreatened by the rebels, further supported by his continuation to dissolve the monasteries during the period- despite this arguably being the catalyst for the initial rebellion occurring- and existing as a grievance in a list of the rebels jumbled demands in the Pontefract Articles.