The Causes of Cuban Missile Crisis

Amidst the Cold War, what factors ignited the Cuban Missile Crisis? And in the same breath, what factors ultimately succeeded in preventing the world’s greatest superpowers from pursuing the unprecedented and deadly threat of nuclear war? In the US, the crisis first gained attention in mid-October of 1962, when American spy planes captured images that confirmed the installation of nuclear rocket sites in the newly-communist Cuba (Frankel 8). Once installed, this collection of Soviet ballistic missiles would of obtained the capability to target the majority of the United States, thus cementing an alarming Soviet threat (Frankel 15). Furthermore, the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, eagerly anticipated negotiation leverage as a result of such immediate, offensive threat (Miller and McAuliffe 25). Meanwhile, the US had already claimed its ability to threaten the Soviet Union through the American Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey (Frankel 8). Thus, both nations sensed growing threats to their security, and the US promptly emphasized their willingness to stop and board an Soviet ships that would encroach on the US’s regional territory (Graham 348). As tensions increased, the need for immediate leadership and possibly momentous decision-making quickly arose. In response, then US president John F. Kennedy assembled an Executive Committee (ExCom), an extension of the National Security Council that would immediately analyze the crisis at hand, and aim to construct appropriate resolutions. This essay will explain the Cuban Missile Crisis’s escalation and mitigation by analyzing the manipulative desire for power, the hindrance of complex decision-making systems, as well as the security-driven motivation for deterrence and diplomacy.

In face of unprecedented offensive threats, both nations sought to deter the other from attacking by elevating their own military might (Miller 24). On an immediate scale, the US quickly realized its role of spectator to alarming Soviet military expansion that would soon breach the US’s region of power. Beginning from the summer of 1962, the Soviet Union commenced Project Anadyr, and initiated the process of shipping nuclear missiles and other weapons on disguised cargo ships (Frankel 7). In the process of maximizing their global power, the Soviet Union recognized the importance of achieving nuclear superiority and regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 138). To make matter worse, the US’s regional power was further threatened when Cuban guns hit and downed an American U-2 plane (Allison and Zelikow 353). From the Soviet point of view, the US acted in an equally aggressive way, as “Khrushchev became disillusioned with the Kennedy administration after the attempted invasion at the Bay of Pigs and increases in American military spending” (Eubank 734). In summary, both nations ought after power, and thus caused aggravation and alarm in the other. On a larger scale, during the Cold War, the United States perceived itself as the world’s most advanced democracy, and thus embraced a strict defensive stance against communism (Laffey and Weldes 561). In fact, “to Kennedy, Cuba was a Soviet satellite”, and his negative impression was elaborated by his diligent work with ExCom throughout the crisis (Eubank 734). However, this simultaneous pursuit labelled both parties as the aggressor to the opposition, aggressors who threatened to upset the balance of power. In turn, the overall conflict was repeatedly re-ignited over uncertainty and misperception of the opposition’s intentions and subsequent actions (Jervis 676). As each nation feared that the other would succeed them in military power, decision-makers on either side proceeded with their plans to uphold their power at all costs. In this scenario, the desire for ultimate power meant that neither the US or the Soviet Union were willing to give in, thus allowing the crisis to escalate towards the eventual apex of the threat of nuclear war.

The United States’ system of decision-making further complicated the crisis, and contributed to stalling the discovery of a complete resolution. President Kennedy was not solely responsible for any actions, as US responses were “the consequences of innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals are various levels of bureaucratic organizations” (Allison 690). President John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert Kennedy were not the soul central figures, as leading advocates existed for all main alternatives: a naval blockade, a military strike, and diplomacy” (Garthoff 922). ExCom debated over the benefits and costs of a blockade versus an air strike, with members of the council raising concern over US passiveness and Soviet retaliation, respectively (Allison 705). Furthermore, Kennedy himself complicated the decision-making process with his personal considerations of public opinion; Kennedy preferred the air strike option, as mentioned above, due to its rapid ability to “remov[e] the missiles before Election Day” (Lebow 473). And “if it had not been for the restraining hand of his advisers”, this decision would have been made (Garthoff 922). Similarly, delays also occurred at the beginning of the crisis, when the US Air Force and CIA argued over which team should assume responsibility for operating a special flight over Cuba (Allison 705). Therefore, while Soviet threat persisted, deliberations continued to occur with no avail. On the other hand, from the Soviet perspective, decision-making processes were similarly complicated by their relationship with Cuba. In short, the Soviet Union formed an alliance with the newly-communist Cuba, taking advantage of the opportunity to indirectly check the US, or in other words to buck-pass their US rivalry (Mearsheimer 25). As the proximity of Cuba to the US was crucial to the Soviet’s success, the Soviet Union found themselves committed to the alliance, and thus in consideration of numerous new actors. To begin the process, Fidel Castro, who was the Prime Minister of Cuba, held strong concerns regarding Cuba’s lost of independence and the tarnishing of his own public image (Frankel 9). Despite these concerns, Cuba still accepted the role as a platform for Soviet missiles, drawn in by the allure of gaining military capability, along with the support of a global superpower (Frankel 12). In fact, Castro struggled to contain the news of their newfound power — a flaw which frustrated Khrushchev, who had insisted on keeping his project a secret (Frankel 20, 21). As news gradually spread, the United States in turn were able to prepare for the conflict, hence the formation of ExCom. All in all, both nations reacted to threats through aggression of their own, but struggled to embrace their structure as “black boxes covering various gears and levers in a highly differentiated decision-making structure” (Allison 690). While the shared desire for power existed, distinct actions and resolutions did not emerge in sufficient time.

For both the US and Soviet Union, the overall crisis centred around attempts to balance one another, committing acts to contain the opposing aggressor and prevent their attempts to achieve more power (Mearsheimer 25). The two nations did so by illustrating their respective military mights, hoping to deter the other from attacking. More specifically, deterrence aims to increase the cost of action, to the point where such costs exceed the possible gain (Lebow and Stein 6). In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, the US would react to Project Anadyr by illustrating their willingness to fight, as Kennedy was aware of the loss of power and threat of war that derived from unchallenged aggressive conduct (Lebow 472). Prior to the apex of the conflict, Kennedy publicly warned that the US would act if Cuba soon posed an offensive threat (Laffey and Weldes 562). As the threat remained, and Soviet ships continued to deliver missiles to Cuba, Kennedy and ExCom explored their options for deterrence. A blockade, which was ultimately executed, presented an indirect course of military action, but still posed the possibility of violence if Soviet ships were to disobediently proceed, regardless of the quarantine (Allison 697). Additionally, an air strike towards Cuban missile bases would explicitly declare the US’s stance against the Soviet Union. However, such actions would lead to indiscriminate violence, and could see the Soviet Union mirror such attacks against Turkey. In each case, the concern for retaliation and subsequent war loomed over decision-makers, and thus worked to deter either side from continuing with their displays of superiority. Within this bipolar world, the US and Soviet Union were granted unprecedented power, and the responsibility to maintain global stability (Edelman et. al 72). Eventually, both Khrushchev and Kennedy recognized that their decisions were a social act whose consequences extended their respective organizations and into the world (Anderson 202). As Khrushchev noted in a secret letter to Kennedy: “‘you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose’” (Allison and Zelikow 355).

In order to find a concrete, effective resolution, Khrushchev and Kennedy collectively pursued diplomatic strategies. Even though this outcome did not reward either nation with a dramatic increase in power, both threats were effectively contained and therefore continued to follow a realist interpretation of power. For the US, removal of missiles from Cuba was the main priority of the diplomatic negotiations. In return for this withdrawal, the Soviet Union could demand that Turkish missiles be withdrawn as well (Allison and Zelikow 353). However, before Kennedy could officially extend his offer, Khrushchev accepted the offer, settling “for a non-invasion pledge alone”, and converting Cuba into a zone of peace (Allison and Zelikow 363). Overall, the crisis magnified Kennedy and Khrushchev shared understanding of the consequences of nuclear war and thus of any aggressive actions.

In conclusion, the United States and Soviet Union’s desire for power escalated the intensity of the conflict, as both nations sought to limit the other’s expansion while claiming their own superiority. The complexity of decision-making within a government further worsened the conflict, as key actors struggled to agree upon an effective resolution. Ultimately, both Khrushchev and Kennedy recognized the dangers of the crisis, and were forced to retract their aggressive behaviour. In order to put an end to their tensions, these two nations pursued diplomacy that involved strategic acts to continue their long-term pursuit of power, despite conceding power in the moment.

Overall, the Cuban Missile Crisis offers valuable insight into the intricacies of decision-making in times of crisis, specifically for key decision-makers (Dobbs 1). The analysis above illustrates the haphazard nature of international relations, as the desire for power is clouded with misperception and uncertainty about the opposition’s intentions. Thus, this case study is far from one “in courage, wisdom, and fine-tuned signal sending” (Dobbs 3). As this specific crisis occurred within a bi-polar global system, and can provide a foundation for analyses of present day conflicts, such as the nuclear arms race in the Middle East. In the present, decision-makers are better informed of the risks of such competitions, as the Cuban Missile Crisis led the world to the detrimental brink of nuclear warfare —and fortunately, the world still remains.