Analysis Of The Strict Liability In Tort Law

Introduction

This essay seeks to explain on the principle of strict liability as explained in the law of tort. It will also show the elements that are needed to subside with the latter principle. Not only that but also to give a full explanation on the case of Rylands v Fletcher with respect to the mentioned principle. Decided precedents will be given in order to justify and give more meaning to the principle of strict liability.

What is strict liability?

In civil law, a tort is an intentional; or rather an act of negligence, which causes injury to another person. A tort is the basis for a civil lawsuit which includes acts such as assault, negligence, products liability and intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, there may be certain situations where someone can be held liable for some cause even though his or her actions were not negligent. This is called strict liability, also known as liability without fault or absolute liability (though there are possible defences to this kind of tort).

The Oxford Law Dictionary has defined strict liability as liability for a wrong that is imposed without the claimant having to prove that the defendant was at fault[footnoteRef:2]. The Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as a liability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something safe[footnoteRef:3]. It can also be defined as a legal doctrine that holds a party liable for their actions or products, without the plaintiff having to prove negligence or any fault[footnoteRef:4]. All these definitions sum up to one point which is that a person can be held liable even if there acts or omissions do not amount to negligence.

For example when X owns a lion, and it escapes and injures Y, he will be held liable even though he wasn’t negligent. Such a situation is illustrated in the case of Alphacell Ltd v Woodward where the defendants had been charged with causing pollution to a river which was contrary to s2 of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951. The river had been polluted because of a pipe that connected to the defendant’s factory, which had been blocked, and the defendants had not been negligent. However, The House of Lords held the defendants were liable. Lord Salmon stated:

“If this appeal succeeded and it were held to be the law that no conviction be obtained under the 1951 Act unless the prosecution could discharge the often impossible onus of proving that the pollution was caused intentionally or negligently, a great deal of pollution would go unpunished and undeterred to the relief of many riparian factory owners. As a result, many rivers which are now filthy would become filthier still and many rivers which are now clean would lose their cleanliness. The legislature no doubt recognised that as a matter of public policy this would be most unfortunate. Hence s2(1)(a) which encourages riparian factory owners not only to take reasonable steps to prevent pollution but to do everything possible to ensure that they do not cause it”

The law only imputes strict liability to situations it considers to be dangerous by nature. This principle was brought about in the case of Rylands v Fletcher.

The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher

In the case of Rylands v Fletcher (1868), Rylands, a mill owner, had paid some independent contractors to make a reservoir on his piece of land, which was intended to supply water to the mill. In the course of the construction, the contractors discovered the shafts and passages of an old coal mine on the land, some of which joined up with a mine situated on neighbouring land, belonging to the claimant. The contractors could have blocked up these old shafts, but did not, and as a result, when the reservoir was filled, the water from it burst and made its way through the shafts and flooded the claimant’s mine, thereby causing damage. The defendant himself was not negligent, since there was no way he could have known about the shafts, and nor could he be held vicariously liable for the contractors, who were clearly not his employees for that purpose. An action for trespass was unavailable, simply because the damage was not direct and immediate, and at the time of the case the tort of nuisance could not be applied to an isolated escape. Nevertheless, the House of Lords held that the defendant was liable in tort. Lord Blackburn J defined the rule as:

“A person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must do so at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural consequence of its escape”.

This meant that it does not matter if you are negligent or not, as long as something dangerous you own escapes and injures someone, you will be held liable. He further explained, ‘‘The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbour’s reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbour’s privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbour’s alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own...’’

Elements of Strict Liability

Generally, for a claimant to succeed in a case of strict liability, they must prove the following elements at all costs:

Dangerous things

The thing that the occupant brings forth to their land must be likely to cause serious damage if, at all, it escapes, even though it might be quite safe if it is not allowed to escape.. In other words, it can be said that ownership of something dangerous is enough to hold you liable or responsible if at all it escapes. Examples of dangerous thing includes Ultra hazardous activities (such as the use of highly volatile chemicals and highly explosive substances), keeping of wild animals (such as lion, tigers…etc.) and making products that are defective. In the case of Hale v Jennings where the defendant had operated a chair-o-plane roundabout at a funfair. One of the chairs from it broke loose and hit the plaintiff. According to the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, this was held to amount to an escape. The defendant was held liable for injury sustained by the plaintiff. However, Winfield has stated that ‘if the possibility of the damage which occurs is scientifically unknown at the time when the escape takes place'' there is no liability’. This simply means that if something dangerous escapes, of which it cannot be explained scientifically, the occupant may not be held liable.

Deliberate accumulation of non-natural use

The thing, that is dangerous, must have been accumulated or brought onto the defendant’s land in the process of some ‘unnatural’ use of the land[footnoteRef:8]. Someone cannot be held strictly liable if the cause of injury was of a natural cause. This simply means that a defendant will not be held liable for damage caused by the escape of water which is naturally present on the land, nor for trees or plants which grow naturally. Such a situation is shown in the case of Giles v Walker (1890), the defendant had ploughed up forest land, with the result that a large crop of thistles grew there.

The seeds from these blew onto neighbouring land, causing the same problem on that land. The defendant was held not liable under Rylands v Fletcher because thistles grew naturally, and had not been introduced by him. In the case of Rickards v Lothian, the Court of Appeal defined non-natural use as: ‘some special use bringing with it increased danger to others.

There Must be an escape

In order for a tort under the doctrine of strict liability to succeed, there must be an escape of the dangerous thing from the occupant’s land to the claimant. If the dangerous thing does not escape to the claimants land, then they cannot succeed under strict liability. We see such a situation in the case of Reads v Lyons (1947) where the plaintiff was a munitions inspector employed by the ministry of supply, who was visiting the defendants’ munitions factory. A shell that was being manufactured there exploded in the course of her employment, thereby injuring her, and because there was no suggestion that the defendants had been negligent.

She claimed under Rylands v Fletcher. The defendants were held not held liable, simply because, although high-explosive shells clearly were ‘dangerous things’, the strict liability imposed by Rylands v Fletcher requires an escape of the thing that caused the injury. It was held that escape, for the purposes of applying the proposition in Rylands v Fletcher, according to Lord Simon, means:

“Escape from a place where the defendant has occupation or control over land to a place which is outside his occupation or control’’

Lord Macmillan also stated that

‘‘There must be the escape of something from one man’s close to another man’s close’’

Damage

Just like every tort, there should be proof of injury or damage in order to successfully claim for damages. So the escape of a dangerous thing must be proved to have been the cause of the damage or injury. There must not be a novus actus interveniens. However, it is not in all cases where someone can succeed even though they suffer damage. Some Courts give dissenting views on who can actually sue. There is dicta that suggests that occupation is an essential condition.

We can see such a situation in the case of Weller v Foot & Mouth. Disease Research Institute where a virus escaped from the defendant’s land and infected cattle rendering them not to be sold. The plaintiff, an auctioneer, sued under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher for the loss he made which was as a result of the cattle being infected. However, the claim failed because the House of Lords held that pure economic loss was not recoverable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.

Conclusion

All in one, strict liability is a liability imposed on a person for a wrong that is imposed without the claimant having to prove that the defendant was at fault. This doctrine was formulated in the case of Rylands v Fletcher where it was held that a person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must do so at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. For someone to be held liable for this tort, there must be a dangerous thing, an accumulation of a non-natural use of a dangerous thing(Giles v Walker) and an escape of the dangerous thing from the defendant to the claimant (as explained in Reads v Lyons).