The Pursuit Of Material Self-Interest Behind State Action

The driving factors behind state action is a widely speculated and debated topic. Material self-interest, for one, is said by Neorealist Theorists to be a key factor in determining how states act – Neorealists emphasize the material aspects of international politics, focusing on how it is a “self-help arena” in which states prioritize their national security through material power. This is critiqued by those who hold a Constructivist view, who hold that state action is instead dependent on “dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the world”. In this paper, I will argue that material self-interest is not the primary factor that drives state action. Firstly, this paper aims to discuss the typical instance in which a state acts according to its material self-interests through a Neorealist view. Secondly, it critiques and raises other alternative driving factors of state action held by Neorealists and Constructivists, exploring the alternative driving factors through Constructivist and Neorealist lens to aid in creating a more holistic understanding of what drives state action.

The pursuit of material self-interest can be best explained through a Neorealist view, which follows the logic of consequence. This dictates that survival is the primary driving factor for all state decisions. Acting rationally, they will act in ways driven by their material self-interest – gathering power to ensure their survival. Furthermore, according to the balance of power theory, these states ensure their survival by forming balances of power regardless of their intentions. Such a theory proves particularly helpful when examining the case of Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union – with the post-Soviet world order tending towards unipolarity, the western bloc (primarily USA and the European countries) is left with no state to balance again. Russia, inheriting the USSR’s former place, thus ensures its survival by attempting to re-balance against the western democratic bloc. Russian behavior in regions formerly under Soviet influence thus becomes an empirical example of a state acting on its material self-interests. From the view of structural realists, Russia’s move to annex Crimea in 2014 could be a response to a national security threat. After all, Russia had previously already demonstrated an element of possessiveness over Ukraine, which had previously been part of the Soviet bloc of influence, warning Ukraine against signing economic deals with the West to “think twice about any such embrace”. Three key acts contributed to Russian behavior: Firstly, the offer of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) to Ukraine, which offered a “framework for modernizing its trade relations and for economic development by the opening of markets via the progressive removal of customs tariffs and quotas, and by an extensive harmonization of laws, norms and regulations in various trade-related sectors, creating the conditions for aligning key sectors of the Ukrainian economy to EU standards”. Secondly, the perceived expansion of the European Union through the Eastern Partnership, an initiative targeted towards former Soviet republics, a region of strategic geopolitical importance to the EU. Thirdly, that Crimea would turn into a naval base for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) added a serious military threat. According to theorists, Russian response “as a defensive stance against the expansion of the West perfectly [fits] realist and neorealist concepts”. Both acts stated above are of material concern to speculation the Russian Federation, potentially threatening their survival and well-being in economic and military terms. Thus, this is an instance in which a state acts on its material self-interests, specifically that of defensive self-preservation.

However, an examination material self-interest alone is likely to be insufficient in exploring the factors of state action. According to Neorealists, another key assumption of the theory is that under anarchy, the lack of an international governing body means that “a state cannot be sure that today’s friend will not be tomorrow’s enemy”. Furthermore, while states pursue the same goal, the capabilities of each individual state differ largely. Given the state of the Russian economy and military after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the vastly more stable and powerful USA at that time, it would be possible to claim that Russia could have felt threatened. The uncertainty of what other states may do, coupled with the uneven distribution of material capabilities (in this case, economic and military) could heighten a sense of insecurity, prompting the defensive Russian response observed.

It is also worth considering the ideational motives behind Russia’s actions, using a Constructivist approach. Russian response to western actions could have been not only due to a material threat, but potentially as a rejection of the values that the EU embodies in accordance with Russian identity. The EU espouses ideas and norms of “the consolidation of [Western] democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Its expansion into the east consequently draws Russian opposition, allegedly due to how it “threatens the development of democracy in Russia”. Democracy, as a political system, is immaterial, and purposefully overlooked in Waltz’s structural realism theories to create a simplified worldview. Furthermore, with Russia having largely inherited the Soviet Union’s role in the post-Cold War era, its leaders are said to continually “assert Russian parity with the United States” and by extension, the West, despite it having weakened greatly in material terms. Hence, in this case, material self-interest may not be the primary driving factor behind state action, as immaterial factors such as national identity, as well as a sense of insecurity, could have influenced Russian behavior.

While we cannot disregard the pursuit of material self-interest, it is also important to examine empirical examples in which other factors appear to take precedence over the guaranteed survival of a state. I wish to focus on the role of a state’s identity in determining its actions. Following the logic of appropriateness as held by Constructivism, actors “seek to fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices, and expectations of its institutions”. The identity of a state could be said to be integral to the determination of its actions, which is an aspect of states that Neorealism overlooks. Constructivism, which purports the idea that state action is in fact not driven by material self-interest, supplements Neorealist shortcomings through its consideration of national identity. These are created when the state holds at its core a shared meaning, creating a role for itself in the international arena, and by extension, expectations of how it is supposed to act. The state’s identity then goes on to influence its interests and actions, of which are likely to be congruent with the identity it has constructed for itself. Ultimately, states typically formalize and institutionalize their interests, which manifest in “interstate normative structures, including regimes and security communities”. Such holds true in the following example of Iran: Iran’s national identity manifests in a nuclear policy despite its material costs, suggesting that the pursuit of material self-interest is a manifestation of a state’s ideals, and not necessarily a reason on its own.

An empirical example of a state acting on its identity and not material self-interest can be seen in the case of Iran’s nuclear behavior. The discovery of Iran’s secretive pursuit of nuclear power sent shockwaves rippling through the international community as it threatened the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Further analysis by critics through a Constructivist lens explores potential ideational reasons behind Iran’s insistence to continue with it, especially considering how Iran’s nuclear policy has come with its fair share of problems. One such issue is the imposition of economic sanctions imposed by other countries to hinder Iran’s acquirement of nuclear weapons: these proved especially damaging, with the value of the rial “falling by a third to 7,500 rials/dollar from its pre-sanction rate of 4,200 rials/dollar”. Additionally, Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s deputy Foreign Minister, reveals the threat to national security faced when pursuing nuclearization, as it “invites a preventive use of force by the status quo powers and thus plunging the nation into an unwinnable war”. If one were to examine the situation in purely material terms, it becomes apparent that accumulating nuclear power may be detrimental to the survival of the state. Ideational explanations behind Iran’s motives become clearer. Some scholars argue that the accumulation of nuclear powers is a manifestation of an idea that comprises Iran’s national identity – Iran’s nuclearization is theorized to be rooted in its history and its revolutionary identity. In this case, the state identity drives the action of nuclearization, securing its identity and ideals at the potential expense national security and survival.

Ultimately, to argue that material self-interest is first and foremost the driving factor of state action runs the risk of overlooking several other equally important and interlinked factors, namely the role of uncertainty and identity as covered in this paper. Neorealist responses to such a statement are particularly integral to understanding the pursuit of material self-interest, but Constructivism, in exploring “the intersubjectively shared ideas that shape behavior by constituting the identities and interests of actors”, aids in creating a deeper and more holistic understanding of the driving factors behind state action. Material self-interest is thus unlikely to be the primary driving force behind state action on its own. Instead, the uncertainty of states’ behavior and the interest to secure national identity, especially in certain states with historical context, can be a more prominent driving force than material self-interest itself.