The International Profit and Dependancy of the Korean War

The major downfall of the European and American forces is that they underestimated the Asian forces, and the willingness of China to fight in protection of its interests. They saw the Koreans as an inferior people, and this prejudice led them to believe that they could be easily defeated. Also, the UN command was easily swayed by McArthur's prediction that China would not enter the war. After a daring landing by UN troops at the port of Inchon, they rapidly re-captured Seoul, and it's nearby airport. The overall objective was to cross the country, effectively cutting the North Korean Army in the south off from its supplies in the north near the 38th parallel, and then crush it. However, for some reason, McArthur insisted on putting the majority of UN forces back on the landing ships and ferrying them around the country to the other side of the peninsula. As a result of this move, many North Korean troops were able to escape through the gap and back to the north. Nonetheless, by the end of September, the remaining enemy troops in South Korea had been killed or captured, and the democratic state of South Korea was re-established.

At this time, the UN leaders saw a chance to reunite Korea under one democratic flag, by force. This had to be done very carefully as the Chinese were convinced that the real UN intent was to invade China itself. In order to not anger the Chinese, McArthur could only use South Korean troops once he got near the Manchurian border with China. The general's other limitation was that if he did encounter any Chinese or Soviet troops that he should back down and return below the 38th parallel. McArthur was convinced, however, that the Chinese would not interfere in Korea, and he convinced the UN Counsel of this; so they were a little more lenient in their limitations.

In his quest to capture communist Korea, McArthur broke every rule of military science. He did all of the things he shouldn't have when facing a possible confrontation with the whole of the Chinese army. The UN forces were divided, and sent up opposing sides of the peninsula in a way that they could not communicate with each other because of high mountains between them. Soon McArthur began to get reports of his men seeing Chinese soldiers among the ranks of North Koreans, but he ignored them and pressed on. In late October 1950, an American unit reached the Yalu River, the border with China; here they were surrounded by Chinese and destroyed. For the next four days, the UN was on the defensive, as both Chinese and North Korean troops assaulted them. However, after four days of intense combat, the Chinese army disappeared. McArthur took this as a sign that they had given up, and not as a warning that the Chinese were willing to fight. He once again started on the offensive pressing ever closer to the Chinese border.

Unknown to McArthur, the Chinese had deployed hundreds of thousands of troops along the border, and even in North Korea itself. On November 3, 1950, the Chinese government issued a final warning that they believed the UN intention was to invade China, and that they will protect their homeland. By that time, the Chinese had approximately half a million troops along the border, anxiously awaiting the arrival of the UN forces. On November 25, the Chinese offensive commenced all along the Yalu River. Soon, the longest retreat in American history would begin, as they fled the advancing communist army. During this retreat, the losses to the Chinese, who had little respect for human life, were enormous, as they were attacked all day by US Navy planes, protecting the retreating United Nations and South Korean forces. The UN troops eventually reached the coast where they along with ninety thousand Korean refugees were loaded into ships and brought back behind the 38th parallel.

Therefore, it is plausible to blame the US for the conflict, as it seems that Stalin's shift in attitude towards a North Korean invasion came about largely because of signals from the US, which suggested they would not support South Korea in the event of a War. This is supported by Stalin's conversations with Kim il-Sung, in which he states that 'according to information coming from the United States...the prevailing mood there is not to interfere'4. Subsequently, Stalin contacted an aide revealing that he was 'ready to help'5 North Korea, reunify the country. Perhaps it was a coincidence, but three weeks prior to this decision, Dean Acheson (US Secretary of State, 1949-53) had made a defence perimeter speech, in which he omitted South Korea from a list of countries which the United States would automatically defend, stating that 'the Asian people are on their own

Over the coming weeks, the frailty of US-South Korean relations was further emphasized, notably by Congress's defeat of an economic assistance package for Rhee's government. Such instances, along with the rejection of Rhee's requests for armaments, meant that the US 'failed to arm the South sufficiently'8.Thus, it helped convey the impression that they were unconcerned by the South's political future. Moreover, that the Americans had refused to take direct action to 'prevent a communist victory in China'9, suggested to Stalin that they would not intervene to forestall a similar outcome in Korea. Therefore, it is clear that US failure to provide explicit support to the South encouraged a North Korean attack. This is because Stalin, having not previously approved an invasion, gave his consent to the idea, perhaps seeing it as a potentially cheap Cold War victory

However, the instigator of the conflict would appear to be Kim Il Sung. This view is corroborated by Hitchcock, a member of the American Military Government in Korea from 1945-8, who declares that 'the attack on South Korea was ordered by Kim il-Sung'10. Inevitably Hitchcock attempts to clear the US of any wrongdoing and places the blame on Kim Il Sung. However, this analysis is validated by a series of original telegrams sent from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, stating that 'Kim Il Sung asks permission to begin military operations against the South'11, whilst another declares that 'Kim Il Sung asked to buy Soviet Union arms for the three infantry divisions he intended to form'12. Therefore, we might assert that 'primary responsibility for the outbreak of war' rests 'on North Korea'13. Indeed, the persistence and aggression of Kim are shown to be a critical factor in both pressuring Stalin into supporting the conflict and instigating the War.

The argument that Kim Il Sung was responsible for the conflict is broadened by the notion that he initiated the invasion through his manipulation of Stalin. The North Korean leader played upon Stalin's insecurities, threatening that 'if Stalin would not endorse an invasion, he [Kim] would go and place himself under Mao'14.This view is supported by a telegram from Shtykov to the Russian authorities, which tells how in a recent conversation, 'Kim underscored that Mao Zedong promised to render his assistance'15. Whilst China was willing to help Kim to some degree, this threat seems to be wholly unrealistic - mainly because Mao was preoccupied with reconstructing the economy and consolidating the revolution. Although China has yet to release official documents concerning the conflict, the fact that they sent only two divisions of North Korean troops back to Kim indicates their inability to offer effective support. Thus, it would appear that Kim Il Sung exaggerated China's position to Stalin, which is likely to have presented a threat to Stalin's leadership of global communism, thus, pressuring the Soviet leader to aid North Korea. Meanwhile, it is possible to see how Syngman Rhee's unpopularity in the South encouraged Kim to attack. Indeed, it would appear that the majority of South Koreans were opposed to the reactionary police state overseen by Rhee. This notion is reflected in the May 1950 elections, which saw Rhee retain only 22 of 210 seats. Subsequently, the 'North Koreans saw Rhee's electoral setback as an opportunity to launch a new political offensive'16, as Kim felt strongly that an 'attack would spark strong anti-Rhee uprisings in the South'17. This view is further justified by a telegram which declares that 'the people in the South are waiting for liberation from the yoke of the reactionary regime'18. Rhee's unpopularity would have made it seem that an invasion of the South would be welcomed by the people, encouraging the North to attack. Although we might not cite Rhee's presence as a prime cause of the War, it acted as a catalyst for the conflict, helping to accelerate the process. However, we might blame the US for Rhee's failure, as they were responsible for imposing him as President. Perhaps they should have had the foresight to recognize that a westernized, intolerant man would not make for a good unifying leader.

Nonetheless, it would appear that conflict was inevitable between the Communist North and Capitalist South, as it seems unlikely that such ideologically contrasting regimes could ever coexist peacefully. Indeed, Kim il-Sung continually expressed his desire to defeat the Capitalist South and unify the country under Communism. Therefore, we might find further reason to hold the USA and Russia responsible for the conflict, due to their separation of the country, in 1945. The division of Korea saw the country polarized as 'two US colonels were given half an hour with a map, before deciding upon the 38th Parallel [as a point of separation]'19; chosen for its convenience, it had no historical, cultural, or topographical significance. Subsequently, America and Russia established two opposing sides which compounded the potential problems in constructing a unified, indigenous government thus creating the context for a civil war. Indeed, it would seem there were elements of genuine civil conflict in the Korean situation as both Rhee and Kim il-Sung 'had been talking of war'20. But, due to the Cold War climate, a civil war would escalate into an international conflict. Thus, it is important to note that the initial division of Korea was an important factor in establishing the potential for conflict.

Whilst Stalin was not the prime mover behind the war (a role more associated with Kim Il Sung, he was the sponsor of North Korean ambition, which enabled Kim to unite the country. Indeed, Kim was firmly the instigator; not only did he continually indicate his desire to unify Korea, he also looked to manipulate Stalin into supporting his effort. However, the shift in Stalin's attitude towards the war seems to have occurred due to signals which suggested the likelihood of US neutrality. Yet, responsibility cannot be assigned to the US, as its only contribution to the start of the war was passive. Instead, the conflict was only made possible due to Stalin's support of Kim. This is an idea which is succinctly captured by Vojtech Mastny, who argues that 'North Korea was hugely dependent on Moscow, in much the same way as its Eastern European satellites were'.