The Impact of Nazi Germany's Intervention in the Spanish Civil War

If Nazi Germany's intervention in the Spanish Civil War were examined in isolation, one might conclude that it was a tremendous success. In the military sphere, they achieved their principal aim when Franco's Nationalist forces emerged victorious. Additionally, Nazi Germany was able to use the Spanish conflict for the purpose of training personnel and testing equipment, an exercise which would prove itself useful in their later European campaigns.

In the strategic sphere, they were able to prevent any extension of the perceived encirclement of Germany which had been such a concern to Hitler in the wake of the Franco-Soviet Pact's ratification. Furthermore, their endeavours in ensuring a friendly Spain enabled Nazi Germany to discount the potential threat posed by a Popular Front Spain, allied with France and Britain, in a future conflict. In the economic sphere, Nazi Germany had been able to coerce Franco into making significant concessions which appeared as if they would be exceptionally useful in terms of meeting the objectives prescribed by Hitler in his Four-Year Plan Memorandum. In the political sphere, Nazi Germany managed to cultivate close ties with Nationalist Spain, with Franco adhering to both the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Treaty of Friendship in 1939. There were even successes in the wider European sphere which might not have been possible without the Spanish conflict, for instance: the cultivation of an alliance with Italy, the annexation of both Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the breakdown of Anglo-French relations with Russia.

However, it cannot be examined in isolation since the wider European context is vital in determining the extent to which Nazi Germany's intervention in the Spanish Civil War can be considered a success. Their failure to secure a desirable military agreement with Spain, and Franco's decision in favour of neutrality in the Second World War, meant that despite the expense of their decision to aid the Nationalists, Nazi Germany gained little of great military significance. Whilst the military experience gained in Spain could be cited as evidence to the contrary, even if one were to presume that the lessons from Spain were correct and effectively applied during the Second World War, they were evidently not sufficient to alter its disastrous outcome for Nazi Germany. Though they did manage to prevent the continued existence of a Spain which might ally itself with France and Britain, Nationalist Spain's neutrality dictated that they were not particularly useful to Hitler. The end of the Spanish conflict, as well as the outbreak of the Second World War, made it difficult to wring additional economic concessions from Spain, or even to ensure the fulfilment of existing economic agreements.

Furthermore, given that long-term investments constituted much of their economic activity in Spain, Nazi Germany's collapse just a few years later meant that these activities bore little fruit for them. Their political 'successes' were proved, by Franco's unwillingness to enter the Second World War on Hitler's side, to have been largely symbolic and thus of little substance.

In terms of their wider European 'successes', the alliance with Italy proved to be a hinderance to Nazi Germany, with Mussolini initially unable to enter the Second World War alongside Hitler, and the Italians proving an ineffective military partner when they finally entered the fray. Whilst the Anschluss and the invasion of Czechoslovakia were successful initial steps towards the achievement of his central and Eastern European ambitions, they came at a cost. Though they did contribute to the Soviet Union's alienation from Britain and

France, these expansions, along with Hitler's actions and policies during the Spanish conflict, solidified the Anglo-French entente. Furthermore, the Franco's decision to invade Russia in 1941 meant that the Anglo-French alienation from Russia proved to be temporary, with the three nations combining to bring about Nazi Germany's ultimate defeat.

Therefore, owing to the outbreak of the Second World War, Franco's refusal to partake, and its outcome, Nazi Germany's involvement in the Spanish conflict served only to unnecessarily drain their resources, as well as to increase tensions in Europe, ultimately leading to the conflict which brought about their demise. Thus, Nazi Germany's intervention in the Spanish Civil War was a complete failure.

Britain, having been at the heart of the increasing tensions in Europe throughout the Spanish Civil War years, played a central role in Nazi Germany's defeat in 1945, and thus might be described as somewhat responsible for the ultimate failure of their intervention in the Spanish conflict. In the years between Hitler's appointment as Chancellor and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, relations with his preferred alliance partner were defined by misunderstandings, with both nations believing they could persuade the other to see the value in their own visions for Europe's future. Thus, by the outbreak of the Spanish conflict, Hitler, having begun to perceive the irreconcilable divergence in British and German aims, as well as having witnessed British 'weakness' in their responses to the Abyssinian crisis and to his own revisions of the Versailles Treaty, was questioning whether an Anglo-German alliance was a worthwhile pursuit.

The British response to the Spanish Civil War was defined by non-intervention, a policy to which they faithfully adhered throughout, hoping that it would isolate the conflict and thus eliminate any danger it posed to European peace. The Franco's, perceiving this policy as a further indication of British decline, steadily became less interested in an Anglo-German alliance. Nazi Germany's reactions to Britain's various attempts to enforce their aims, such as the non-intervention agreement, numerous control schemes, and several attempts to tackle the 'volunteer question', were invariably defined by their own aims. They had much to consider when adopting a stance towards the British initiatives, most particularly: the impact it might have on Franco's military prospects, and how it might impact their relations with the other European Powers.

The only moments during the Spanish conflict which might be described as potential flashpoints in wider Anglo-German relations were the aftermaths of the Deutschland and Leipzig incidents, and even in these instances there was no serious prospect of armed conflict developing between them. Rather than providing any notable 'watershed' moment which turned Britain and Nazi Germany against one another, the way Anglo-German relations developed throughout the Spanish Civil War was more subtle. Their divergent policies towards the Spanish conflagration, though a source of irritation for both parties, initially had a relatively limited impact on wider Anglo-German relations, however, as the conflict dragged on and their mutual grievances accumulated; Anglo-German relations became increasingly tense. Furthermore, throughout the Spanish Civil War, Hitler became increasingly convinced of Britain's weakness and irresolution, and thus he was emboldened to pursue his central and Eastern European ambitions, as a result of which Anglo-German tensions developed into outright mutual hostility.

Thus, the most pivotal ways in which Nazi Germany's intervention in the Spanish Civil War impacted Anglo- German relations were the resultant increase in mutual tensions, and Hitler's increasing confidence that he could pursue his aims unchecked, both of which combined to make a significant contribution to the dire state of Anglo-German relations by the Spanish conflict's conclusion in April 1939.