The Constructive Reasoning of Epistemology

Looking at the article, “Fake New and Partisan Epistemology”, Regina Rini goes into depth in analyzing the concept of fake news and the epistemic basis of social media. She follows this by defending the idea that believing one’s friends on social media has epistemic virtue. Additionally, she advocates for the claim that individuals are likely acting rationally when they believe the fake news that is being rapidly spread on social media within their own social network, which she does through a four-step reasoning process. This four-step reasoning consists of (Rini E-43):

1. Analyzing the concept of ‘fake news’.
2. Identifying distinctive epistemic features of social media testimonies.
3. Argues that some forms of partisanship can be viewed as epistemically virtuous.
4. Concludes that a solution to the problems posed by fake news is through a change in institutions, not solely through individual epistemic doings.

At face value the construction of argument appears reasonable; however, looking closer one can see there are questionable assumptions integrated within her four-step process, highlighting, in particular, the question of the reliability of treating one’s social media network as a valid source of news (epistemically speaking). In the introduction of “Fake News and Partisan Epistemology”, Rini writes, “I will argue that fake news transmission is often individually responsible. That is, individual people typically act reasonably when they grant greater credibility to fellow partisans, even if this sometimes leads to the acquisition of false beliefs” (Rini E-44). Defending this hypothesis, Rini advocates for the claim, “… that partisanship-in-testimony-reception is sometimes compatible with epistemic virtue” (Rini E-50). Dissecting this, Rini intends to explain that sometimes it is valid to assign greater confidence to those who share a common affiliation with oneself. In defense of this claim, Rini argues that those with common political affiliations know each other to also have belief commonalities morally and politically. Due to these shared belief spheres, it is reasonable to assume that people who share similar political beliefs have adequate cogitating skills, and therefore are principled in the news that they choose to share. Recognizing that political segregation is common in today’s society (reaffirming the shared belief spheres mentioned previously), the news received from social media is rationally believable, acknowledging the earlier claim rationalizing the partisan-in-testimony-reception.

Although this argument is valid and provides the appearance of soundness, there are definitive issues with some of the claims made by Rini. The first claim made states that people with common political alignments share normative ideologies. While this can present truth, there are cases in which this has been proven wildly inaccurate, meaning that people with similar political alignments occasionally hold drastically contrasting views on particular topics. Additionally, it is common for people to have varying reasoning to justify why they voted for a particular candidate. Essentially, every individual withholds their own reasoning for voting one way or another; therefore, it is ultimately impossible to find a candidate whose position, on various topics, aligns perfectly with everyone in their political party. Knowing this, it is possible for two people, with the same political affiliation, to possess conflicting values. The second issue in Rini’s argument falls under the second premise, stating that it is reasonable to believe that those who share normative ideologies have adequate cogitating capabilities. This claim has several complications invested in its structure. To claim that reasoning capabilities correlate with normative ideologies poses the opportunity that people will cease being skeptical of their own beliefs. This fosters the dangerous idea that satisfactory reasoning must eventually lead to the creation of your own standardized beliefs, making those who possess countering ideologies incapable of sound reasoning. It also neglects to address the possibility that some people obtain the same ideology through various processes (one may have researched an ideology vigorously while another may believe in it because their family chooses to). Thus, assuming a correlation between adequate cogitating abilities and shared beliefs proves itself to be epistemically unsound.

While Rini offers a convincing argument stating that it is individually reasonable to believe that social media networks offer trustworthy news, many flaws can be identified when examining closer. Her claim that people who align politically share the same normative ideologies fails to hold true in real-world politics, while her claim suggesting a correlation between those who share normative ideologies and adequate cogitating capabilities is highly suspect on the individual level. Understanding this, it is fair to address that Rini’s argument, in its attempt to solidify her claim of epistemic virtue within social media networks, is unsound and remains unsound until these pitfalls are resolved.