Operation Anaconda and Its Execution by the United States Army

Anaconda: Organizational Management

The United States Army has long been portrayed through movies of storied units planning, resourcing and fighting any enemy and winning battles with ease. This Hollywood portrayal of planning and execution proficiency is not always the case. In early 2002 the United States Army executed Operation Anaconda where they faced a well-equipped, professionally trained, and well-fortified enemy for the first time since Operation Desert Storm. Failing to effectively employ organizational management functions at the joint level almost cost the U.S Military hundreds of lives during Operation Anaconda.

Organizing

In the Army leaders use different planning strategies to ensure missions are planned and executed to meet the commander’s intent while accepting the lowest amount of risk as possible. One of these strategies used is called organizational management process, where leaders organize, plan, staff, direct, and control the mission. Within this planning processes Army leaders try to organize all parties involved, staff all warfighting functions, direct guidance, and control the mission from conception to execution. Effective joint leaders ensure they align the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) with organizational management process. This alignment can be best seen in Operation Anaconda when highlighting management of resources and talent management. These functions of organizational management where foregone during Operation Anacondas planning phase for the sake of time. Joint leaders also failed to relocate key command and control nodes or human capital in order to asses planning across multiple organizations.

Directing

Understanding the timeline of events better helps identify the joint forces commander’s shortfalls with respect to the direct function within operational management. Operation Anaconda’s planning phase began in early January of 2002 when the Combined Forces Command (CFC) identified a large pocket of resistance remaining in Khowst-Gardez (KG) Afghanistan. The Combined Components Land Component Commander (CFLCC) who at that time was stationed in Kuwait issued a warning order to Task Force (TF) Dagger to begin initial planning for Operation Anaconda on 6 January of 2002. TF Dagger is a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) element who typically and by doctrine don’t plan large scale operations involving multiple conventional forces. They were alone and afraid for all intents and purposes when attempting to plan an operation that involved every type of joint force the United States has to offer.

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 10th Mountain Division didn’t assume responsibility of the mission until 13 February 2002, two weeks away from execution of this operation. This failure of assumption of command aligns with the directing function organizational management. Had CJTF 10th Mountain been the main effort for planning sooner, they would have been able to direct specific guidance and control echelons more effectively. The onus of that failure falls on CENTCOM commander. CENTCOM should have made sure CJTF 10th Mountain owned this operation at its conception instead of two weeks into its planning cycle. CJTF 10th Mountain made the relocation move from Uzbekistan to Bagram, bringing along its minimally manned Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) on 20 February so they can finally direct guidance.

Planning

Using the timeline of events and what is known about organizational management, joint leaders can use this operations shortfalls in planning as a tool for future operations. One of those shortfalls was the failure to correctly utilize the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) as the liaison element for air to surface fires. CJTF 10th Mountain did not begin to cross coordinate with joint forces like the BCD operating in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) until the 20th of February. “The JAOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated command center and should be staffed by members of all participating components, to include key staff positions” (JP 3-09, 2019, p. 40, para. a). Failure to provide those key staff positions with the correct rank and experience was a shortfall as well. Organizing and managing resources should be a joint commanders bread and butter in a sense. CJTF 10th Mountain should have done a better job at managing human capital and facilities when planning the move of the BCD. “A BCD is a specialized, regionally focused Army element that serves as the senior Army operational commander’s liaison with the air component.” (JP 3-09, 2019, p. 35, para. 4).

Another failure that falls specifically under the planning function of organizational management is the failure to establish Tactical Air Controll Party’s (TACP’s) within subordinate units before D-day occurred on the second of March, 2002. “Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) members specialize in synchronizing air assets into the ground battlespace and work closely with the Army, Navy, Marines and Coalition partners to manage large areas of operations” (Airforce Website, n.d). This failure is owned by multiple echelons during operation anaconda. CJTF 10th Mountain failed to deploy with any TACP’s, forcing the 18th Air Support Operations Group (ASOG) to scramble and secure TACP elements from other units across the theater.

Staffing

Traditionally when executing joint operations involving any air support the BCD and CAOC are just as important with respect to command support relationship as the CFLCC and the ground force is. The BCD along with elements from the 18th Air Support Operations Group where forced to scramble with a massive 128 slide Operations Order (OPORD) brief only eight days from D-day. This brief of the ground units Concept of Operation (CONOP) is how the CFACC build their joint air support plan effectively. That plan includes the management of air assets, in number, by command support relationship, and by location on the battlefield. This plan is important for the joint commander so they can ensure the resource management portion of organizational management is being sufficiently met, and to ensure that if and when ground troops need CAS they have the option. Joint leaders failing to organize the planning phase and controlling resources was evident in Operation Anaconda when both CJTF 10th Mountain and TF Rakkasan needed far more CAS requests than previously anticipated. If the CFLCC and CFACC had aligned planning efforts and de-conflicted mission priorities for the small amount of CAS assets the mission has assigned, far fewer ground troops would have been put at such unnecessary risk.

References

1. Fleri, E., Howard, E., Hukill, J., & Searle, T. R. (2003). Operation Anaconda Case Study. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.
2. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. (2019). Joint Fire Support. (Joint Publication 3-09). Retrieved from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_09.pdf