Evaluation of the Success of the Plan Colombia

Plan Colombia aimed to rescue the Colombian economy. The US foreign aid program for Colombia has been compared to the Marshall Plan in its “scale relative to the beneficiary’s size” (Mendez 2017, p.2). Firstly, this essay with outline the history of Plan Colombia and its stated objectives. The essay will further aim to discuss the challenge of measuring success regarding public policy and discuss the heuristic that Marsh and McConnell have developed as a systematic way to discuss and assess policy success. Then, using the method of Marsh and McConnell (2010), the essay discusses to what extent Plan Colombia was a success. Using Marsh and McConnell’s heuristic this essay argues that we are able to assess the policy outcomes from Plan Colombia and establish the moderate success of the policies established in the plan in 1999.

Plan Colombia

Prior to the formation of Plan Colombia in 1998-1999, “Colombia was widely described as a country in crisis” (Tate 2015, p.4). Colombia was suffering from an economic downturn, a growing illegal drug trade, and an escalating guerrilla war. The guerilla war was mainly driven by “the Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia (FARC)” who “launched an insurgency in 1963” (Paul et al 2014, p.7). While the U.S. was already providing aid to Colombia prior to the established plan, the newly elected president, Andres Pastrana, requested and lobbied for further support. In June of 1999, “in response to the large increase in cocaine production activities and the rapid deterioration of security conditions,” an inter-agency group was established to develop a proposal for a joint U.S.-Colombia strategy (Alviles 2008, p.409).

Plan Colombia emerged from a range of policy priorities from both governments, these included peace policy to counter the guerilla groups, counter-narcotics policy to battle vast cocaine production, counterinsurgency policy to strengthen the weakened security forces, and economic development policies to spur economic activity, especially in remote regions. However, the most prioritized objectives were to reduce the production and trafficking of illegal drugs “by 50% over the plan’s six-year timeframe” and to improve security conditions in Colombia by “regaining control of the large areas…that were in the hands of illegal armed groups” while simultaneously attempting to boost the local economy(Meija 2016, p.9). The strategy that was ultimately implemented was developed by the government of “President Andres Pastrana in consultation with US officials” in the Clinton administration (Beittel 2019, p.26).

Thus, Plan Colombia was formed and presented as a six-year strategy. The US contribution was decided to be “1.6 billion dollars over two-years” with approximately “70% of US assistance devoted to assisting Colombia’s army” (Aviles 2008, p.410). Both governments had agreed that in order to truly eradicate the drug trade and fight the guerilla groups, Colombia had to increase and strengthen its security forces. US policymakers described it as “an effort to eradicate drug production and trade by attacking the sources of production which are located in areas of guerilla influence or control” and since the guerillas are associated with the areas of drug production regions, “this line of argument proceeds, Washington has directed its military” teams and aids to “destroying what they dub the ‘narco guerillas’ (Petras 2001, p.4616).

The military support that the US gave consisted of “training and equipping counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian Army and specialized units of the Colombian National Police” which included the supplying of helicopters and other related military materials (Aviles 2008, p.413). Since 2000, U.S. military aid and training to Colombia has totaled just over $6.8 billion (Villar and Cottle 2011, p.109). In order to tackle drug production, the Colombian government implemented two types of policies, those who aimed at disrupting the production by attacking the coca plants and policies aimed at attacking the later stages of production and trafficking. Additionally, the government aimed to implement alternative livelihood programs which were designed to provide coca-growing communities with new and legal options for social and economic development (Mejia 2016, p.13).

Plan Colombia eventually evolved and took place under changing leadership and conditions. Bipartisan support in the US government existed through various administrations, Clinton, Bush, and Obama. In current conditions, Plan Colombia has reached a new phase as “congressional support for Plan Colombia” has shifted and the original plan has been followed by “successor strategies such as the National Consolidation plan” which place less emphasis on Colombia as a country in crisis and accordingly U.S. funding overall has begun to decline since 2008 (Beitell 2019, p.29).

Measuring Success

In order to be able to judge whether Plan Colombia was a policy success, we must further understand and establish how policy can be assessed as a success. Policy success is defined as “the political dimension of assessment refers to the way in which policies and policymakers become represented and evaluated in the political arena” (Bovens et al. 2001, p.20). However, establishing whether a policy fulfills this definition has been debated in the literature. Marsh and McConnell (2010) claim that “the existing literature fails to outline and discuss criteria against which success could be judged (Marsh and McConnell 2010, P.565). In order to aid the research, they have developed a heuristic, which aims to offer a more detailed and systematic way to assess policy success. They emphasize that what they have created is not a model but rather a technique or approach that is not guaranteed to be optimal the way in which a model does.

Their heuristic refines to three dimensions or categories of policy success, process, programmatic and political. Each of their categories of policy success has indicators, a policy would be considered more of a success if there is evidence of the policy fulfilling the indicator. The process category refers to how the policy was formed in government more specifically, “process refers to the stages of policy-making in which issues emerge and are framed, options are explored, interests are consulted, and decisions are made” (Marsh and McConnell 2010, p.572). The indicators for process are whether the policy is produced through the process of constitutional procedures and values of democracy, whether the legislation was passed with limited or no amendments, whether the policy had the support of a sufficient coalition in government, or whether the policy was innovative and new or whether it involved the adoption of policy from elsewhere.

The programmatic dimension refers to the actual implementation and results that stemmed from the policy. These indicators are whether the policy was implemented as per the stated objectives, whether it achieved the intended outcomes, whether it was an efficient use of resources, and whether the policy and the implementation of the policy benefitted a particular interest group (which could be a class, gender, race, religion, institution, political party, etc.). The last dimension is the political one. This category has only one indicator which is whether the policy was particularly popular, whether it aided in the government’s re-election chances, or whether it helped boost the credibility of the government. All of the indicators in the heuristic have specific forms of evidence required in order to confirm whether they add to the policy success. These forms of evidence can range from legislative records including legislative voting patterns, government records and statement records, academic reports, and internal and external evaluation of policy such as audit reports, to media commentary and opinion polls in relation to both the general government popularity and the policy itself.

Each of these dimensions is important in the establishment of policy success. This heuristic built on the existing literature as prior there had been no consideration on the process of the policy formation. Each of the dimensions carries its own value and input in the assessment. Processes which include constitutional or even quasi-constitutional procedures have more legitimacy. Additionally, when a policy is subject to legislative process and scrutiny but still passes with most of the same details is considered a success (Marsh and McConnell 2010, p.573). Lastly, a policy which is transferred from elsewhere can “bring the idea that it was successful” in the original jurisdiction (Marsh and McConnell 2010, p.574). The programmatic dimension is often synonymous with evidence-based policymaking. Often governments focus on these outcomes and indicators specifically regarding fulfilling stated outcomes and the efficient use of scarce government resources as claims of policy success can be made on the grounds that “the policy led to ‘waste’ reduction, cost-cutting or more efficient use of available resources” (Marsh and McConnell 2010, p.573). Lastly, the positive impact that the policy made for an interest group can make a policy successful. If the policy has been assumed to have a positive political impact this can assist the electoral prospects of a party or help rescue them from low approval ratings. Therefore, opinion polls and media commentary can be seen as evidence that an initiative was successful in improving support for the government, governing parties, and their programs.

Issues with Measuring Success

Although Marsh and McConnell allow researchers to approach the issue of policy success with a systematic framework, there are still large difficulties involved including perspective, timeframe, and methodology issues. Firstly, success is extremely relative, and it depends on which interests we focus on. Policy outcomes reflect the power relations and can be interpreted drastically differently by opposing stakeholders and thus impact the assessment of a policy. Additionally, assessments of success can be heavily dependent on a temporal dimension as the programmatic or political dimension of success can involve a short or long timeframe. However, this can influence an assessment as, for example, a short-term policy can seem successful yet in a longer timeframe may be seen as unsuccessful as more evidence regarding the programmatic or political dimensions can be revealed at a later time than the original assessment. There are major methodological difficulties in assessing the relative importance of the different dimensions of the heuristic. There is no single dimension that is more important than the other and a policy can be a success in one dimension but not the other. For example, when a policy is a success in programmatic terms, as the quantitative outcomes of the policy have been good, but not in political terms because of the way the policy is portrayed in the media and opinion polls are low. Marsh and McConnell fail to provide justification or describe what should be done in a situation such as this. Finally, success is not all or nothing but rather a degree as a policy does not have to fulfill all dimensions perfectly to be considered a policy success. Additionally, something can be considered not a success but also not a failure (Marsh and McConnell 2010, p.573). These policies are considered “non-failures” as they do not perform well in the heuristic but are considered possibly the best policy option to tackle the issue that it is aiming to (Bovens et al 2001, p.596). While there are issues with the heuristic, it still allows for a more systematic analysis of success that had not existed prior. The heuristic provides the indicators and the evidence needed to methodically and thoroughly assess policy success.

Was Plan Colombia a Success?

This essay now aims to apply the heuristic provided by Marsh and McConnell (2010) in order to assess whether this was a policy success. In an aim to eliminate some of the complexities with the heuristic, this essay will strictly be considering the policy success of Plan Colombia from 1999 until 2010. While the United States still continued to provide aid to Colombia after 2010, the level of “foreign assistance provided by the US…began to decline in FY2008” and thus I aim to focus on the military and financial heavy years of US assistance in the region (Beittel 2019, p.39). Thus, the current National Consolidation Plan and Peace Colombia will not be considered. Additionally, this essay will be aiming to analyze the policy in terms of the impact that it had in Colombia and not in the United States. While they are policies decided by the US, it is foreign policy and not domestic, and is implemented with the intention of impacting Colombia. However, the political impact on both Colombia and the United States thus, this will be considered as the policies impacted both governments politically. While there is considerable debate regarding the true intentions (moral, imperial, or economic) of the US intervention in Colombia, this essay will not discuss this as it does not contribute to the evaluation of the success of the policy.

Firstly, when looking at the process dimension. The policies of Plan Colombia were by the constitutional procedures that it passed in the U.S. Congress. Additionally, President Clinton’s Plan Colombia was slightly opposed by international activists, which resulted in limiting the number of U.S. troops in Colombia (Villar and Cottle 2011, p.109). This objection and its consideration further strengthened the policy at its criticisms were taken into consideration and incorporated into the policy. There was a wide range of bipartisan support for the policy at the time of deliberation, specifically regarding the anti-narcotics aspect of the plan (Hylton 2010, p.102). In terms of the programmatic dimension, we must look at whether Plan Colombia fulfilled the stated objectives. Their main goals were to significantly diminish the production of cocaine and additionally strengthen the security forces in the country.

While the relentless implementation of a decades-long counternarcotics campaign has led to significantly improved security outcomes in Colombia, the value of the country’s cocaine production and trafficking business continues to be worth about US$4.5 billion a year (or about 1.2 percent of the country’s GDP) (Mejia 2016, p.14). However, the US was able to make improvements regarding the security conditions in Colombia and “by 2010, Colombian security forces had finally gained the upper hand once and for all” (Paul et al 2014, p.7). These improved security conditions allowed for sustained economic development and growth and a “30% decrease in rural poverty levels” (USAID 2016, p.1). The violence in Colombia overall has dropped dramatically however, Colombia still remains the world’s largest producer of cocaine. Meija 2016 further claims that the aerial spraying of the coca crops is no longer effective in killing the plants as farmers have learned to protect against the pesticide. Furthermore, the glyphosate used can have a negative impact on the environment and human health. However, this does not mean that the policies implemented have not reduced cocaine production as records from UNODC show that production has gone from 700 metric tons in 2000 to 370 metric tons, which is a 46% decrease in production, very close to the 50% goal which was stated in the policy.

Lastly, we will be looking at the political dimension. Plan Colombia was commended in both nations and received support from the public and fellow politicians. In 2009, William Brownfield, then-U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, described Plan Colombia as “the most successful nation-building exercise that the United States has associated itself with perhaps in the last 25-30 years” (Beittel 2019, p.37). Some analysts have deemed Plan Colombia as one of the most enduring and effective U.S. policy initiatives in the Western Hemisphere as it “brought the country ‘back from the brink” (Tate 2015, p.7). Some have lauded the strategy as a model for US efforts in “Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere” (Tate 2015, p.7). However, not everyone has been this positive. Human rights organizations and NGOs across the world have claimed that the US militarization has caused harm in the region. Some claim that the increased military presence could make areas more violent and were not adequate for solving Colombia’s persistent drug and economic problems (Stokes 2001, p.71). However, other organizations claim that kidnappings, terrorist acts, and homicides were down. Colombia has criticized the US however regarding the alternative livelihood programs which were aimed to encourage farmers to abandon cocaine production for legal crops in exchange for governmental support, however, “many of these programs have faced implementation problems, and those implemented have been limited” in their abilities to train or their monetary incentives (Mejia 2016, p.13)

With the mixed results in every dimension of the heuristic, this demonstrates that Plan Colombia was not necessarily a policy success. However, as stated before, that policy merely not being a success does not entail that it was a policy failure. The policy did not fail as it did not escalate the situation in Colombia, and we must also consider what could have occurred in Colombia without aid from the United States. Without this aid, Colombia would have most likely crumbled as it was a nation that was already in crisis. With the aid given by the United States, Colombia was able to stabilize the security force and was able to encourage economic growth. Thus, this policy program should be considered a nonfailure or to be moderately successful in certain aspects.

Conclusion

Using Marsh and McConnell’s heuristic this essay argues that we are able to better assess the policy outcomes from Plan Colombia and establish that this policy has been a nonfailure and has achieved moderate success.