A Summary and Brief Overview of the Narrative in A Civil Action

Chapter 1: Over several instances of childhood leukemia hit Woburn, Massachusetts, from 1966 to 1986. Civil engineers found in the early 1970s that neighborhood wells G and H, along with trichloroethylene (TCE), were polluted with quite a few possible toxins. The wells were shut down after this instance. The area had a strong history of industrial activity, which included many tanneries. W.R. Grace Co. and Beatrice Foods, two significant corporations, controlled factories, and plants in the town.

Chapter 2: A group of parents who had children that developed leukemia (some had lived but many of the children died) were seeking legal help for their case. They consulted Boston lawyer Joe Mulligan and signed a contingency agreement with his practice to file a lawsuit against anyone accountable for local good pollution. In early 1981, a report on the Woburn cancer cluster was released by the Center for Disease Control, showing that the most cancer prices once were at least seven instances higher than normal, but now it has not connected the infection with the cases of leukemia.

Chapter 3: Jan Schlictmann was once a younger lawyer early in the Woburn case with the legislation agency of Joe Mulligan, Reed & Mulligan. Before finding a hobby in the regulation and starting law school, he had floated around some careers. He tried to begin his own company, but only a few years later he eventually worked at Reed & Mulligan in Boston. At the company, the Woburn case had not been postulated, and Schlictmann began to work on it. He closely worked at the company with Kevin Conway, who told him that the condition of Woburn was once 'a black hole.' As the statute of limitations on the case progressed, Schlictmann partnered with a firm that wanted to work with him on an environmental case. He handed over the case to the agency but continued as a local lawyer. Eight days before the limitations statute passed on May 1982, they submitted a complaint stating that Beatrice Foods and W.R. Grace Company were accountable for contaminating the wells and causing the Woburn leukemia cluster.

Chapter 4: Jerome Facher had much experience as a lawyer. His affiliation was spoken to Beatrice Foods, which possessed the Riley Tannery north of Woburn. William Cheeseman labored for another gigantic Boston affiliation that spoken to W.R. Beauty Co., which possessed a fabricating plant north of Woburn. Cheeseman particular in pre-trial strategy then again than trials, and recorded a Rule 11 development in resistance to Schlictmann and the company in an exertion to allow up the case instantly. The development charged Schlictmann with recording a pointless and unwarranted claim, and with diverse suspect moral conduct such as requesting clients. The judge held a hearing on the movement. Schlictmann denied to meet up with cross-examination by implies of Cheeseman on the concept that doing so would damage his commitments to his clients. The hearing was conducted by implies of Judge Skinner based on submitted questions by implies of Cheeseman, and the Rule 11 development was once denied.

Chapter 5: After successfully negotiating a large settlement in a different case, and seeing the credit and most of the proceeds go to a senior partner who had little to do with the case, Schlictmann decided to leave Reed & Mulligan and start his firm. Kevin Conway went with him and requested that Schlictmann get rid of the Woburn case, but Schlictmann refused. In the new firm’s first major case, Schlictmann won a then-state-record $4.7 million verdict in a personal injury case. He then decided to work on the Woburn case, which had not been worked on for over a year. A Harvard study has come out showing that people exposed to wells G and H had suffered several adverse health effects, and the study concluded that there was a strong possibility the contamination was linked to the leukemia cases. William Cheeseman argued that the plaintiffs couldn’t prove any of their accusations scientifically, so the case shouldn’t go to a jury. Judge Skinner denied the motion. Cheeseman later acquired the help another defendant, Unifirst, and their manufacturing plant was close to the wells. Unifirst quickly settled with Schlictmann for just over a million dollars, and the Woburn families agreed to use a large portion of that settlement to finance the rest of the case against W.R. Grace and Beatrice Foods.

Chapter 6: Both sides started out conducting depositions. After hearing some of the family members, Jerome Facher feared that he would lose the case if the families have been allowed to testify. Depositions of employees at the plant life printed that some chemicals had been dumped into the ground and that some managers who had been deposed early in the case had withheld data or lied. Based on this, Schlictmann notified the U.S. Attorney, and a federal investigation began. Further discovery confirmed that a great number of chemicals had been disposed of directly into the ground. Schlictmann deposed John Riley, proprietor of the Riley Tannery, who denied using TCE and denied any information of polluting the 15 acres of land around the factory. Depositions of different townspeople confirmed that dumping had taken place for years on the 15 acres Riley owned, however, Schlictmann was no longer able to discover tons of something in phrases of documentation or written evidence.

Chapter 7: Schlictmann’s firm amassed scientific documents from as many of the family contributors as possible. He employed clinical professionals to evaluate the archives and to potentially testify at trial. The firm’s payments related to the case mounted, in part due to the fact Schlictmann spared no expense on experts, medical tests, geological exams of the dumpsites, and reveals to be prepared for trial. With five months left earlier than the trial, the firm had spent almost a million greenbacks on the case. It had to borrow cash over and over to continue to finance the case. During depositions of the plaintiff’s experts, Schlictmann objected strongly to positive strains of questioning, which he thought the attorneys had all agreed not to pursue till a later date. Following Schlictmann’s profanity-laced tirades in the deposition room, Jerome Facher filed a movement to have Judge Skinner censure Schlictmann. Judge Skinner strongly rebuked Schlictmann for his unseemly conduct in the depositions, however, did not censure him. Following the convention with the judge, Facher attempted to start negotiations with Schlictmann. Schlictmann refused to pick out a variety at which he would settle, even after Facher provided an agreement on the order of one million dollars.

Chapter 8: On the advice of quite a few different lawyers, Schlictmann sought the assistance of a Harvard regulation professor, Charlie Nesson. Nesson determined to be part of the criminal group as a consultant. In a meeting with Schlictmann’s firm, he suggested that the case may want to be worth some distance greater than they had originally thought. If punitive damages had been given, the verdict may want to attain into the heaps of thousands and thousands of dollars, rather than the ten or twenty million legal professionals had been discussing previously. Even the judge mused at one factor that the case should be worth an “astronomical” amount. Depositions continued, and Schlictmann deposed the several dozens of expert witnesses the protection attorneys had found. These specialists disagreed with Schlictmann’s experts, pronouncing that TCE and other chemical substances in the water were no longer present in excessive enough concentrations to cause the outcomes located in the Woburn children. Much of the testimony centered on the lack of proof of causation, because no one had ever discovered what triggered acute lymphocytic leukemia in children. Meanwhile, the EPA started pump tests at wells G and H to see if groundwater from the manufacturing facility sites had reached the wells. The data counseled it had. Schlictmann’s finance guru Gordon calculated the costs-to-date of the case at over $1.8 million, however the idea that the association may want to live on until trial as long as there used to be no postponement.

Chapter 9: As the scheduled pre-trial convention with the decide approached, Jerome Facher realized that he was once not geared up to try the case. There had been over 20,000 pages of data and depositions, and almost fifty experts, some of whose names he did not know. He determined to search for a continuance, and filed a 20-page affidavit to the judge describing the complexity of the case and the amount of proof to be sorted, and requested for a seven-month continuance. At the hearing, Judge Skinner refused to supply the continuance no matter Facher’s pleas. At Judge Skinner’s request, Schlictmann’s group prepared a contract demand. The demand they wanted added up to $175 million over a span of 30 years. They hosted the protection teams at an inn banquet corridor and presented the case and their demand. Jerome Facher asked to keep the hotel- provided pen, then walked out of the room, observed by using the different defense lawyers. Jury determination began two weeks later, on February 1986. After they had decided on a Jury, Judge Skinner held a convention about the shape of the trial. Schlictmann wanted to present his case a way that he believed worked best. Charlie Nesson gave the idea of doing a “test case” of one of the families. Jerome Facher proposed a bifurcated trial, first on the issue of whether or not the organizations had polluted the groundwater, and 2nd on the issue of clinical causation. Judge Skinner decided to use Facher’s plan, which intended that the first 1/2 of the trial would be a warfare of the professionals on complicated hydrological issues, and the households would now not go on the witness stand before the second half (if it passed off at all). Just earlier than the trial, a member of Facher’s group tried once more to settle with Schlictmann. He presented $4 million total for a dismissal of Beatrice Foods. When Schlictmann did not accept, he presented to try to get $8 million. Schlictmann decided to counter-offer earlier than taking the provide to his clients. He countered for $18 million but never heard again from the defendants.

Chapter 10: The trial started with a packed courtroom. Schlictmann’s opening assertion was extremely powerful and left the defense lawyers worried. Facher and Cheeseman each countered with statements focused on the lack of proof of contamination by the companies. Schlictmann presented his case against the companies, with typical objections from the protection lawyers. Schlictmann called John Riley, the owner of the tannery, to the stand, with plans to expose him as a liar. Schlictmann was once unable to get something useful out of Riley and started asking questions that violated rules of evidence and gave Riley room to explain answers in an effective light. Schlictmann had greater success with his examination of witnesses regarding W.R. Grace. As the trial continued, the firm began running out of money. The phones were reduced off at one point, and lenders were in steady conversation traumatic payment. Eight weeks into the trial, Schlictmann is known as one of his key witnesses, a groundwater expert named George Pinder. Pinder testified about how the contaminants had traveled through the groundwater to the wells. On cross-examination, Facher used Pinder’s own evidence to counter many points Pinder had made as a witness. Facher dissected Pinder’s calculations and explanations, which had been in some components truly mistaken. Pinder’s opinion that the wells drew water from the contaminated land was once later proven to be right with the aid of an EPA report, however, the document was once posted two years after the trial. The defense started out providing its case in June. Meanwhile, Schlictmann’s firm settled another small case and used the dollars to pay off its most urgent bills. Facher’s specialists disputed the timing of the infection and shared work that confirmed Beatrice Foods ought to no longer have contaminated the well water before the wells were shut down. Schlictmann’s pass examinations had been positive in weakening their testimony, and he almost succeeded in having quite a few of the witnesses’ testimony afflicted from the record. Schlictmann’s company used to be so deep in debt at this point that all personnel has been taking walks to work, Schlictmann’s car had been seized, and his condo and numerous properties of partners in the firm had been signed away as collateral for financial institution loans. The final witness for the protection was a hydrology specialist who testified that water may want to not have gotten from W.R. Grace’s land to the wells. His testimony was once very tough for Schlictmann, but Schlictmann used to be in a position to pressure him into admitting that Beatrice Foods’ land likely did contaminate the wells. Then Charlie Nesson confirmed that the expert’s calculations were wrong, and Schlictmann was once in a position to completely discredit his testimony just as the trial came to a close. Following the close of evidence, Judge Skinner dominated on some motions for a directed verdict. His rulings excluded some evidence that undercut the plaintiffs’ case in opposition to Beatrice Foods but did not affect the case in opposition to W.R. Grace. Judge Skinner then labored with the attorneys to put together questions for the jury to think about in coming to a verdict. Closing statements commenced on the 77th day of the trial. The defense legal professionals spoke first, discussing the lack of proof that contaminants had made it from the land to the wells. Schlictmann’s closing statement was interrupted by way of objections from Facher, and even his partners discovered his closing puzzling and besides direction.

Chapter 11: The jury began deliberations after receiving directions from Judge Skinner. Their deliberations lasted over two weeks, in section due to the fact of confusion over the questions they have been anticipated to answer. At one point, the jury told the choices they have been deadlocked and ought to not attain a decision, but after a few more days they were in a position to agree. The jury located that there was once no longer adequate evidence to discover Beatrice Foods liable, but that there was once enough to locate W.R. Grace liable for polluting the wells. One key discovering from the jury mentioned that W.R. Grace could now not be held responsible for any contamination earlier than September 1973, which meant that three of the teens who had developed leukemia before 1973 would in all likelihood be dropped from the case in the 2d section of the trial. Schlictmann’s companions realized that their only hope for victory was to settle the case.

Chapter 12: After the jury verdict in the trial’s first phase, Schlictmann and his companions met to talk about what they would settle the case for. They met with an executive from W.R. Grace and a demand totaling $35 million. The executive stated it was too high but it was once a constructive proposal. They met once more in New York the following week. The executive provided them $6.6 million. Schlictmann’s companions insisted he take it, or at least ask the families, but Schlictmann refused. After every other week, Schlictmann met again with the executive and introduced a demand of $16 million. The government took numerous days to confer with the board of directors, but never returned an offer. Schlictmann’s company was deep in debt and on the edge of bankruptcy. At the establishing of the 2d segment of the trial, the W.R. Grace protection group submitted motions to dismiss the plaintiffs whose teenagers had gotten in poor health earlier than 1973. On the day of the expected ruling, Schlictmann requested decide to wait to supply them a danger to settle the case. The choose agreed. W.R. Grace came again with a provider of $8 million, which Schlictmann’s company accepted.

Chapter 13: The contract money was once divided among the households after much of it was divided among other costs. Each family acquired a sum of about $500,000. The EPA document got here out after the trial and confirmed that each Beatrice Foods and W.R. Grace had contaminated the water. In preparing an appeal, Schlictmann’s partners located a file that had not been given to them at some stage in the trial. The file confirmed substantial trying out by way of W.R. Grace at the website online that revealed evidence bolstering the plaintiffs’ case. Schlictmann sought a new trial primarily based on the withholding of the document, however, Judge Skinner denied the motion. The appeal selection got here back upholding the verdict however requiring Judge Skinner to delve also into the difficulty of the withheld report. The misconduct hearing lasted two months and concerned 26 witnesses. In the process, Schlictmann printed that John Riley had lied on the stand for the duration of the trial and withheld different documents. At the start of the hearing, Judge Skinner found that Riley had committed perjury, his lawyer Mary Ryan had dedicated professional misconduct, but that Facher and his team had not. The choose also observed that Schlictmann had violated Rule 11, and consequently refused to sanction Mary Ryan. Schlictmann appealed to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court but was once refused using both. Schlictmann eventually filed for bankruptcy, owing over $1.2 million to many creditors. At about the same time, the EPA filed swimsuit towards Beatrice and W.R. Grace to pay about $69 million to help clean up the area they contaminated. Both groups agreed to pay their share of the costs. Schlictmann flew to Hawaii on borrowed money and spent a few days in inexpensive hotels. He then swam out into the ocean to some distance and had come to the decision that he was going to commit suicide, but gave it a second thought and came back to land.