The Impact of Cultural Awareness on the Success of Operation JAWBREAKER

Introduction

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States attributed the occurrences to Osama Bin Laden, his al-Qaeda terrorist organization, and the Taliban in and around Afghanistan. To attack these terrorists, the United States government with the lead effort, help, and operational capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) initiated Operation JAWBREAKER. Operation JAWBREAKER was a synchronized effort by the CIA and the Northern Alliance against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The success of the operation was swift, deliberate, and decisive in combating terror and protecting the United States against future terror attacks. In efforts and ‘successes’ of the operation, the Taliban lost control in key parts in Afghanistan and strategic parts around the world and ultimately, the al-Qaeda organization was deterred and defeated. This eventually resulted in the death of its leader Osama Bin Laden and key associates of the al-Qaeda network. The purpose of this case study is to determine if cultural awareness and cultural intelligence played a part in the ‘successes of JAWBREAKER. Additionally, understanding the objectives of JAWBREAKER and the effective use of paramilitary will provide support in relation to this operation.

In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the national security landscape relied heavily on covert actions to support United States policies to combat terror. Apart from the support to conduct covert action, the president of the United States issued a directive to the CIA to launch an operation against the Taliban and al-Qaeda organizations; the operation code name JAWBREAKER. To conduct operation JAWBREAKER, the CIA employed certain tactics, which acquire the social, traditional, and cultural intelligence needed to completely interact, and build relations as well as foster collaboration with the Northern Alliance and within the Afghan populace.

Covert actions of the USA

Throughout the history of the United States, covert actions have provided and yielded success in numerous operations. From Latin America to the Middle East and Africa, the United States uses covert operations to support its foreign policy, national interest, and national security. The attack on September 11, 2001, was no exception. With the employment of paramilitary as a means of combating irregular warfare, it is thoughtful to mold or shape operations in an advantageous way. With the president’s directive to the CIA to launch an operation against al-Qaeda, an assumption could be made that the boundaries of which paramilitary operates are more flexible with less bureaucracy compared to a good structure or conventional military. This provides more maneuverability and fluidity, as operatives understand the operational environment. Moreover, with the secret nature of covert operations (JAWBREAKER), fewer publications and articles were be found on this operation. With dependence on second and probably third publications, it may be inferred that bias may set in analyzing data and making assumptions based on limited facts. This signifies a limitation due to subjective thoughts.

The evaluation of this research uses qualitative methodology due to the research approach and theories. In addition, understanding the reasons for allied partnership relationships utilizing cultural efforts to understand and gain an advantage over the Taliban and al-Qaeda Moreover, merging covert actions and cultural understanding provides the basic groundwork of an advanced case study. In the article Covert Action and the Pentagon, “Covert action is defined in US law as an activity that is meant ‘to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly” (Kibbe, 2007). In framing qualitative research in evaluating the cultural understanding of Operation JAWBREAKER operatives, a great understanding of the scope and nature of the relationship formed will prove a success in utilizing paramilitary operations in Afghanistan. Furthermore, some key questions need answers such as what the president meant by “stopping Bin Laden” before making final assessments.

The success of Operation JAWBREAKER in this article is based on the period that operatives were deployed to Afghanistan and the fight that took place at Tora Bora. In this regard, operation JAWBREAKER took approximately three months, from mid-September to mid/end of December 2001. Additionally, the victory of operation JAWBREAKER was assessed by the capturing of Osama Bin Laden, stopping, disrupting, and defeating al-Qaeda and the Taliban organizations. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “President Bush argued that the new war went beyond Bin Ladin. Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there,’ he said. “It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated’. (p.227). Stopped in this article is referred as captured. The 9/11 Commission Report explains how Bin Laden needed to be captured prior to 9/11 and after 9/11.

Cultural awareness

Cultural awareness for the sake of this research remains to represent, understand, and appreciate the basic values and expectations that govern the structure of the Afghan populace. More precisely and identifiably the Afghan tribal structure, religion, and customs will enable the counterinsurgent to exhibit an honest engagement with the population and the purpose towards gaining the acceptability (‘hearts and minds’) of the people. According to the AMA Dictionary of Business and Management, cultural intelligence is the “Ability and sensitivity to the cultural diversity of a globalized market and the ability to adapt to cultural differences and take advantage of them” (2013). To be able to gather actionable intelligence, the CIA had to blend in to accomplish its mission. Cultural intelligence provides the flexibility and the ability needed to enable the success of this mission. Therefore, the CIA operatives exhibited these capabilities prior to and enduring throughout the operation. Research suggests that covert operators with higher cultural intelligence often produce success in covert operations. “Individuals with high levels of CQ are expected to work more effectively on multinational workforces and to adjust successfully to overseas assignments” (Soon & Dyne, 2008).

The CIA took advantage of the political unrest in Afghanistan by collaborating with the Northern Alliance to gain a strategic advantage in its mission. The CIA’s partnership with the Northern Alliance gave Operation JAWBREAKER the deniability, flexibility, and combat power needed to move rapidly against the Taliban. Since the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance has been in opposition. With the horrible tactic of the Taliban especially the abuse of human rights, the CIA aligned itself with the Alliance to fight a common enemy. According to Woodward, “With this diverse network of Afghans, Operation JAWBREAKER team leads needed to capitalize on their cultural intelligence to establish working relationships across cultures and unify them towards a common goal. Since Soviets forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the Northern Alliance had been in opposition to the ruling Taliban and controlled the northeastern region of Afghanistan” (2002).

In the article Overt Acceptance: Cultural Intelligence in Covert Operatives, the author Buckley states that:

At the time, the CIA had limited personnel with the necessary skills to spearhead a covert action campaign in Afghanistan (Crumpton, 2012). These desired skills included an understanding of Afghan languages, such as Pashtu and Dari, and an understanding of terrain (Crumpton, 2012). The simple answer to these problems was the employment of Afghans themselves alongside CIA paramilitary operatives from the CIA coupled with the aforementioned skills as well as an understanding of the enemy and powerful warrior ethos, many Afghans shared a mutual interest with Americans–a hatred of al-Qaeda (Crumpton, 2012). (Buckley, 2015).

To achieve victory, one ought to know and understand the enemy. An alliance with the Northern Alliance and seeking support from the Afghan populace was a step to victory. The success of defeating the Taliban and al-Qaeda could be ‘smelled’ before operatives stepped foot in Afghanistan. Using a partnership strategy in the initial phase of the operation suggested an active competition between the ‘ruling’ Taliban in Afghanistan and the paramilitary of the Northern Alliance due to the loyalty and acceptance of the local populace. Operation JAWBREAKER needed to sustain the security of the Afghan environment, which was one of the requirements from the Northern Alliance.

Because of the discreet and determined efforts, the CIA paramilitary knew the history, culture, and language of the natives as well as the area and thus were in a position to move swiftly against the terrorists. Furthermore, since the CIA operated in smaller groups, they were quickly built up on a massive body of information and a great stable of resources to lunch rapid and robust attacks on the Taliban forces. With the Taliban’s and the al-Qaeda forces pushed back to the extent of fleeing o neighboring Pakistan, victory was achieved. Victory in the sense of disrupting and defeating these terrorist organizations. According to the Soldier of Fortune Magazine, “The combined efforts of the US Intelligence Community, the US military, Afghan allies, and coalition partners led to swift success. By early December 2001—in less than three months—the Taliban regime had been overthrown, a significant number of the al-Qa’ida leadership had been killed or captured, and a major terrorist safe haven had been eliminated. Through it all, the CIA’s integrated intelligence collection, communications, technology, logistics, and delegated leadership were invaluable to the campaign” (2020).

Conclusion

The main culprit of the 9/11 attacks was Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization. If this was the case and the JAWBREAKER operation sort to capture Bin Laden as its objective, then the mission was a failure. On the contrary, to find, disrupt, and defeat the terrorist organization (al-Qaeda and Taliban), the mission was accomplished due to the overthrown of the Taliban regime and forcing both al-Qaeda and the Taliban to flee Afghanistan to Pakistan. Overall, operation JAWBREAKER failed to stop and capture Bin Laden his organization as they continued to operate after the operation. The mission (covert) therefore, which supposedly took approximately three months failed in its objectives but paved the way for military operations to continue in its efforts.

In reference to the disruption of the Taliban and al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, the known culture, information, and intelligence gathered prior to and during the operation with the Northern Alliance made it possible for the JAWBREAKER operation to mingle with the Afghan populace and move quickly to known hideouts and locations of the terrorist. Cultural awareness was needed to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the populace to foresee the operation. Cultural awareness and intelligence were needed to identify high-ranking members of both terrorist organizations. Understanding the culture, political system, and values of the area of operation made it possible to push the Taliban and al-Qaeda organizations from Afghanistan. Although it is assessed in this article that the mission of Operation JAWBREAKER was not achieved, it paved the way for a joint effort consisting of coalition forces, allied partners, and tribal organizations to eventually defeat and ‘stopped’ the al-Qaeda organization.

According to Caldwell and Leonard, Field Manual 30-07, Stability Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change,

“The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success” (2008, 6).

Reference

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