Saudi Arabia’s War Crimes: Why Does the United States Fund Them?

In the time it will take the average person to read this 6-page essay, a child in Yemen will have starved to death. Due to the current Saudi-Arabian and Iranian sponsored proxy war happening in Yemen, 2.2 million children are in need of urgent care, with 462,000 children on the brink of starvation (“One Child Dies”). More general, eight million civilians in Yemen are themselves on the brink of starvation, solely due to the Saudi-continued conflict (“One Child Dies”). All of this is happening with US support, as the United States is the largest arms supplier to the Crown Prince, with Trump focused on continued support of the Saudi campaign (McCarthur). The United States should utilize its position and stop these conflicts by ceasing all arms sales to Saudi Arabia, as the conflict is. Unfortunately, it gets worse, as Saudi Arabia shows no sign of stopping their campaign, and, instead, is displaying plans for military expansion.

Saudi Arabia is stuck in a resource curse that is leading them on a path towards economic collapse. Ryan Riegg of Newsweek explicates that 90% of Saudi Arabia’s economy is dependent on oil, and due to rising domestic consumption and the decline of oil’s importance globally, Saudi Arabia is on the path to economic failure. Riegg quantifies that the Kingdom’s exports have fallen by 75% since 2012 (Riegg). Nafeez Ahmed of the Middle East Eye corroborates that by 2030, Saudi Arabian oil exports will drop to zero. As revenues fall, the kingdom’s ability to constantly spend on social subsidies to limit domestic dissent will disappear, making their collapse inevitable (Ahmed). With the looming collapse of their economy, Saudi Arabia is actively pivoting to their military for answers for two reasons.

First, to save the economy. Ahmed continues that the Saudi government is actively intervening in the region to prolong its petro-dominance by fighting to control oil supply (Ahmed). Riegg confirms that Saudi Arabia is expanding militarily, hoping to save their economy through potential invasions into Iraq, Qatar, and Yemen to control new sources of oil (Riegg). Second, to divert attention. The Economist explains that having alienated the Saudi elite, the Crown Prince relies entirely on the support of the people, and with a deteriorating economy, the Prince will find it difficult to keep his constituency happy (“Saudi Arabia’s”). Maysam Behravesh of Lund University furthers that because Prince Salman’s public support is built around perceived strength from military ventures, he has increased aggression in Yemen to divert domestic attention away from Saudi Arabia’s economic and political problems (Behravesh). Indeed, Behravesh elaborates that the Kingdom’s desire to shift attention from domestic problems ensure attempts to negotiate an end to the war always fail (Behravesh). For these two reasons, Barbara Keleman of the London School of Economics finds that Saudi Arabia has expanded in multiple conflicts across the region in hopes to unite its population against Iran and distract from rocky political conditions (Keleman).

Fenton of the New Arab continues that Saudi Arabia will never meaningfully commit to peace talks, instead opting for its own long-term, interventionist strategy in the region. He continues that even if ceasefires are successful, Saudi Arabia will inevitably intervene further in Yemen, as they have tried to control the country multiple times since the Kingdom’s founding over 80 years ago (Fenton). This spells disaster. Saudi Arabia, in just one conflict, is air-striking weddings and funerals, school buses filled with children, and countless other civilians. They have put eight million people into poverty and on the brink of starvation (“One Child Dies”). Now, imagine if they were to expand to other states in the region, potentially tripling the amount of damage done and lives put at risk. The United States should have no part in this military expansion, but currently Trump continues to support their claims and plans. (McArthur)

The only hope to prevent this offensive is to undermine Saudi Arabia’s capacity to commit acts of violence. Fortunately, cutting off American arms to Saudi Arabia does so. William Hartung of the Center for International Policy explains that Saudi military systems rely on American spare parts for maintenance, and equipment from other exporters cannot operate alongside U.S. military technology. “A bomb is only useful in so far as there is an operable plane or launcher to shoot it that soldiers know how to use” (Hartung). Terrence Guay of Pennsylvania State University corroborates that once a country is “locked in” to a specific weapons system, the cost to switch to a different supplier is prohibitively large for Saudi Arabia, as the switch would entail retraining military personnel on the new equipment (Guay). This is particularly true in the context of Saudi Arabia’s economic crisis: transferring to any alternative exporter would demand replacing all the base, U.S. tech in the Saudi arsenal, and revenues will simply be too low, too soon to do so. Thus, Guay concludes that, if the U.S. ended logistics support, the Saudi air force would be grounded immediately, and that the Saudi military could not operate effectively without U.S. arms (Guay).

This will essentially put an end to the Yemen conflict, and also prevent and disastrous future conflicts Suadi Arabia would trigger. Jeremy Feltman of Foreign Affairs presents the solution: “There is only one expeditious way for Saudi Arabia to end this counterproductive war, and this is to stop its military campaign unilaterally and challenge the Houthis to respond in kind” (Feltman). The United States ending arms sales would accomplish just that, a unilateral cessation of conflict. Others may say that the United States arms sales provide leverage for the leading superpower, and thus allow them to influence Saudi decision-making. They argue that this can lead to peace talks/negotiations or better wartime practices. However, Feltman continues, and ultimately dispels these claims. Feltman explicates that “negotiations will not outpace the coming humanitarian calamity or distract the world from Saudi Arabia’s questionable conduct in this war” (Feltman). Feltman concludes that the only and best way to solve the conflict is for the United States to no longer support the Crown Prince’s military actions (Feltman). Again, Behravesh addresses that because of Saudi Arabia’s “try-or-die” approach to its economy and military, peace talks will never be an option for them (Behravesh).

The US has also shown little interest in actually utilizing this leverage, even when put in the ideal situation to do so. McCarthur of the Washington Report brings to attention the United States’ lack of backbone when it comes to dealing with the atrocities committed by Saudi Arabia. Even after the killing of Khashoggi, a media journalist who was assassinated by Saudi Arabia, Trump, and Congress as a whole, demonstrated no interest and commitment to stopping the conflict (McCarthur). Mohammed Bazzi of The Guardian reports just a few hours ago! that Trump, in the entire year after the journalist’s death, changed none of his strategy and dealings with Saudi Arabia, and instead they are as strong as ever: “Trump dropped any pretext that the US-Saudi alliance is more than a transactional relationship based on maintaining weapons deals, stable oil prices and regional security interests. After all: why would he isolate the reckless crown prince – and lose sales to America’s largest weapons buyer?” (Bazzi).

Other authors on the topic may also argue that, if Saudi Arabia were to lose all militaristic capabilities, then Iranian-backed Houthi rebels would tear Yemen apart. These claims should be weighed heavily, as the Houthis have a long track record of horrific human rights abuses. But it is also important to note that the last Yemen civil war, without outside actors like they have now, lasted only a few months. Indeed, Iran isn’t as invested in the conflict as they may seem (Al-Muslimi). Farea Al-Muslimi of the Center for Strategic Studies writes that with soaring inflation, tanking currencies, and socioeconomic protests across the country, Iran is banking on the nuclear deal to save its economy and cannot afford to go back to complete isolation and sanctions (Al-Muslimi). Thus, he concludes that Iran is seeking to forge closer ties with Europe to counterbalance its souring relationship with the U.S.

At the same time, Al-Muslimi furthers that Iran views Yemen and the Houthis only as a peripheral interest, and has only capitalized on the crisis because it is a low-cost way to bleed out Saudi Arabia (Al-Muslimi). That’s why he concludes that if Saudi Arabia withdrew, Iran would cut off support for the Houthis to increase European support for the nuclear deal. Iran is currently able to intervene in the conflict with no reputational cost because Saudi Arabia is perceived as the antagonist. A Saudi withdrawal would shift blame onto Iran, which is something they cannot tolerate, and thus would ultimately lead them to back out of the conflict (Al-Muslimi). This will make the houthis, and more importantly the war, far less dangerous. Therefore, the United States ending arms sales will ultimately put an end to all current and any future conflicts that Saudi Arabia wishes to cause.