Obsolescence Of Major War Between Great Powers In The 21st Century

Ever since the collapse of Communism in 1991, the international society has been experiencing perhaps the most peaceful era in history. However, others argue that threats to national security have not yet been completely eliminated and the potential for the next major war still prevails. However, when some of the notable changes that have been made since the last century are evaluated, it is reasonable to posit that major wars between great powers are unthinkable at least in the predictable future. Before answering this question, several key terms that may seem ambiguous first need to be addressed. What are some of the defining characteristics of “great powers”? In this context of militaristic war, it is most reasonable to define this term as nation states with Westphalian sovereignty, considering that the vast majority of wars in history have taken place between them. Great powers should also have diplomatic, economical and militaristic capabilities powerful enough to exert influence on not only the regional scale but also on the global level and such capabilities of the opposing participants should be comparable as well.

With the term “great powers” having been established, then what is considered a “major war”? Given the past usage of this term, namely the First and the Second World Wars, a major war can be regarded as a militaristic conflict that “draws on all of their resources and using every weapon at their command over a period of time, leading to an outcome with revolutionary geopolitical consequences.” These by no means are necessary conditions for a war to be qualified as major, and neither does a major war have to be fought on the participants’ national territories, as the proxy wars during the Cold War evidently illustrate. Regardless of its exact form, some even suggest that if there were to be any kind of militaristic major war in the future, it is reasonable to predict that nuclear weapons will be involved, since they are the most destructive weapons yet. With the continued debate on the outbreak of the next major war between great powers, several possible candidates are also often being brought up. Among them, perhaps the more plausible scenario is between the U.S. and China, as the newly emerging power of China threatens the American hegemony. Others also point at the militaristic tension between the U.S. and Russia, as it can be seen in how they have been responding to Crimean and Syrian conflicts. Some even suggest the idea that the next major war would not necessarily be between nation states, especially in light of the current armed conflicts between the ISIL and the rest of the world.

Having defined these key terms, it is reasonable to posit that a major war between great powers is unthinkable, considering the changes that have been made since the first half of last century, when major wars were prevalent. One of such is the change in the nature of nation states, which can be observed from multiple perspectives. The particularly noticeable difference is the increase in the number of liberal democracies since the last major wars. During the First World War, the almost all of the participating countries were empires and during the Second World War, the Main Axis Leaders, who were greatly responsible for the war, were not liberal democratic countries. Such change in global trend towards liberal democracy is notable because democratic countries tend to avoid armed conflicts with each other, thus rendering the possibility of a major war even more unthinkable.

Furthermore, priorities of nation states have also changed. Although they used to prioritize geopolitical or territorial gains, they no longer give as much importance to those, rather focusing on economic security. A case in point is the Chinese economic reform that took place from 1978 to late 1990s. Deng’s new economic policies, which included foreign investment, decrease in government control and increase in privatization, allowed an unprecedented growth in Chinese GDP. Another example can be observed in Russia approximately a decade later. With the collapse of communism and the establishment of a new Russian Federation in 1991, Boris Yeltsin introduced economic reform that made a shift from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy in which they could attempt at seeking increased economic efficiency. Hence the transition towards open economy during the last few decades of the 20th century into the next clearly illustrates the increase in economic interest of nation states, which will be detrimental to the participating countries if a major war were to take place.

Moreover, the nature of war in the 21st century is a lot different from the past. Modern warfare is more preclusive in nature in that methods other than militaristic force are almost always employed well in advance of the onset of an actual war. Although the exact causes of the First World War is still at debate, it is an irrefutable fact that it was an event that had escalated from a series of armed conflicts in which both sides responded militaristically instead of doing so in other ways. In contrast, in 21st century, economic sanctions are one of the most often used and possibly the most effective means to seek for national interest and to handle interstate disputes. The most recent instance is the case of economic sanctions imposed on China by the U.S. after a Chinese military agency purchased military weapons from Russia, which the United States perceived as malign activities with potential threat from both China and Russia. Such increasingly preclusive nature of war demonstrates that nation states have been more hesitant in resorting to armed forces when handling conflicts, thereby making escalation of minor events into major wars even more implausible.

Additionally, paradigms of violent conflicts with potential to war has also shifted in that whereas major wars during the first half of the 20th century were between nation states, or alliances of, many of the recent violent attacks that may eventually escalate into a war have not been targeted at or by particular nation states. Recently, terrorist attacks by ISIL have been constructed as one the biggest threats to the international security. They have claimed to be responsible for more than 90 terrorist attacks in 21 countries not including Syria and Iraq since its self-proclamation in 2014. Given by the history of their recent attacks in North America, Europe, the Middle East and Africa, ISIL does not have specific nation states as target, which is different from how violent attacks with potential for war had previously been conducted. Also, although its counter parts are nation state entities working together in coalition, ISIL hardly qualifies as a sovereign state. While whether these terrorist attacks and counter measurements can rightfully be considered as warfare is at debate, it is nonetheless true that the dynamics of violent conflicts and disputes with potential to war have greatly diverged from the last century.

Warfare weapon technology in the 21st century has also made a leap from what the last century had to offer. The most shocking and detrimental use of weapons in human history took place during the Second World War when the United States dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, which killed approximately 80,000 and 40,000 people respectively. Unfortunately, warfare technology has since advanced even further, resulting in what is considered the deadliest weapon in human history - hydrogen bomb, or thermonuclear weapon. Thermonuclear weapons are exponentially stronger than atomic bombs with significantly worse potential damage, and countries such as Russia and the U.S. already have approximately 1,800 of them ready to be fired at any minute. It is true that such technological advancement does present greater danger to international security; however, it also has ironical implications that contradict some peoples’ expectations, given that they have been almost exclusively used as deterrence measures. Using powerful weapons as deterrence is when a threatening response to a provocation leads that opponent to not act out that provocation, because the potential damage of the response greatly outweighs the prospective gains of doing so. In this sense, because the effects of nuclear weapons are so destructive that the threat of the potential response of the opposing country is in most cases higher than it had been with weapons of last century. Thus, since its conceivable damage has been the highest ever, greatly exceeding the possible gains, increased destructive power of warfare technology will have the counterintuitive effect of deterring a war even more effectively.

Regardless of such increase in barriers to war, some scholarly opinions nonetheless oppose the idea of obsolescence of major war between great powers, particularly in light of nationalist sentiment that still prevails. They argue that because secessionist and nationalist movements demanding for sovereignty have resulted in wars in the past, as long as these forces are present, concluding obsolescence of major wars is hasty. According to their line of reasoning, the recent secessionist activities as evidenced in Catalunya in Spain, Scotland, and Québec Canada can act as an element in triggering a major war. However it must be noted that the concept of sovereignty has changed significantly in that it has been further solidified around states than nationality and ethnicity that separatist conflicts within national borders are regarded more as a domestic issue. Nonetheless, the proponents of the secessionist argument may claim that the potential for these conflicts to cascade into major international wars still exist, since domestic conflicts like civil wars can lead to the involvement of other countries or international organizations like the UN Peacekeeping Troops. However, under the Westphalian system under which the current international law rules, UN Peacekeeping Troops can only participate to the extent that they “stabilize conflicts after a ceasefire”, meaning that they do not have the right to actively pursue a win. Furthermore, even if other countries are involved in civil conflicts, in most cases it is challenging to consider such involvement a major war between great powers for when external militaristic aid is provided, it is usually the case that they assist the central government in helping defeat the separatist forces. Since this form of militaristic involvement is not a war between two sides consisting of sovereign states with comparable militaristic capabilities and influence, it should be regarded as distinct from major wars that is at topic.

Similar line of argument that opposes obsolescence of war resorts to nationalist movements of sovereign states. This view points at recent de-globalization and the global rise of nationalist sentiment and draws parallel from past cases in which nationalism had escalated into major wars. It is true that history has seen cases in which nationalist movements resulted in major wars, as it can be evidenced by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand of Austria by Gavrilo Prinp, a member of a Serbian nationalist organization Young Bosnia, which eventually led to the Great War. However, the 21st century is not the same as it was when WWI broke out in that in the modern cases of populism, which tends to be nativist or nationalistic, is in large part the result of growing economic polarization within affluent state. In facing economic insecurity, citizens of affluent countries perceive possible economic competitions such as foreign labor force as a threat, thereby rendering them conducive to group conformity. Hence recent nationalism is unlike that of last century in that it is not entirely about starting a war for independence from geological or ideological dominance, but rather about seeking their own economic security. Although financial interest is an important element behind de-globalization as illustrated, this very goal will also maintain globalization and deter major wars. Nation states have been more interdependent on another than ever in almost every aspect, and particularly economically. The aforementioned examples of increase in open economies show that international trade and foreign investments have led nation states to be more interdependent than ever. Great powers are well aware of the fact that as much as nationalistic movements may provide the economic security that they seek for, a major war will be detrimental to their economic interest. Hence, despite the current nationalist movements that de-globalize the international society and even promotes hostile attitude towards others, 21st century has become so much more interdependent on another than the past that nationalist sentiment alone will be insufficient to start a major war.

Evaluating the validity of obsolescence of major wars between great powers is a complex task that requires examining not only the past cases in history but also, and perhaps even more importantly, the changes that have been made since their last instance. Therefore, although some elements that have previously triggered major wars in the past still prevail, the current international society of the 21st century has departed significantly from the last century that it is reasonable to posit that major wars between great powers are sunthinkable.