Science Policies And Programs Of Philippines Political Parties
Table of contents
Background of the Study
The Most important characteristic of political parties is that they are parties of the elite. In some senses, parties anywhere in the world are elite formations whether one defines elite in functional terms as those who lead or in sociological terms as those who hold economic and political power. But many parties at least attempt to organize regularized support from a broader segment of the population. These efforts result in a more or less stable membership, regularized patterns of interaction within and between parties, and characteristic forms of ideological or political self-definition.
Political parties in the United States are dominated by the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, constituting what is known as the two-party system, many aspects of which have been written into law, and others of which are customary. The United States Constitution is silent on the issue of political parties, since at the time of it’s signing in 1787 there were no existing parties.
Politics in the Philippines has traditionally been dominated by clans and political bosses and patronage and is characterized by law makers that make decisions based on fiscal incentives rather that beliefs and voters that make choices based on personality rather than reasoned policies This inspire the researches to conduct the study to determine the Critical Analysis of the Science Policies and Programs of Philippines Political Parties.
Statement of the Problem
This Study aims to determine the Critical Analysis of the Science Policies and Programs of Philippines Political Parties.
Specifically, the researcher aimed to answer the following question:
- What are the major political parties in the Philippines: PDP-Laban and Liberal Party?
- What is the nature of elections and political parties in the Philippines?
- What is the significance of electoral system?
Hypothesis
The null hypothesis was tested 0.10 level of significance, which states that the political parties in the Philippines are significance when it comes to electoral system.
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
This study is anchored on the theory of:
- Independent Variables Dependent Variables
- Major Political Parties
- PDP-Laban
- Liberal Party
- Electoral System
Significance of the Study
The significance of the study is considered to be important to the following:
Evaluates the role of formal theory in the study of political parties. It describes the mechanisms by which two important sets of political institutions interact to give structure to political outcomes in democratic politics. It starts by describing the formal theories of electoral rules and the number of part.
Electoral System
Together with the presidential form of government, the electoral system has set the institutional frame for the development of Philippine political parties. The current electoral system, established in the 1987 constitution, has the following characteristics.
Presidential Politics
The other major institutional factor shaping political parties is the presidential form of government. The Philippine presidency is an extremely powerful position, even more powerful than its model, the American presidency. Because of the centrality of patronage for Philippine political parties, the most important powers of the president are his appointing powers and his control over the disbursement of government funds in a highly centralized form of government.
Party System
The structures of all major parties are almost all the same. The basic party unit is at the municipal level. Party units then go up the ladder to the provincial party committee, then the national convention or directorate. These bodies are made up of prominent leaders of the party, former and incumbent elected officials. Within these bodies there are central/executive committees made up of a smaller number of top party leaders. Except for the ruling party, none have permanent party headquarters or paid staff except during elections.
Party Finances
If in the past patron-client ties limiting effective participation by the electorate was the most serious problem corrupting democratic representation, today rapidly growing election campaign expenses is the key problem.
Review of related literature
Readings from the different sources here in Philippines are summarized in accordance the topic and hereby presented to provide a better background insights.
The president and vice president are elected nationally for six year terms with no reelection allowed. The national legislature is bicameral, with a lower house of 200 representatives elected in single member district constituencies for three year terms, plus sectoral representatives appointed by the President. The 24 member Senate has senators elected for six year terms nationally, half elected every three years. Representatives are limited to three terms, senators to two. Local government officials (governors, provincial councils, municipal and city mayors, municipal and city councils) are elected to three year terms, with a three term limit. Senators, congressmen and local government officials are elected in mid-term elections, but during presidential election years, everyone is elected at the same time. During synchronized elections, more than 17,000 positions are filled.
Elections for barangay government, the lowest level of government roughly corresponding to rural villages and urban neighborhoods are held separately. The system has been 'first past the post', whoever wins the most number of votes, wins. Voting in the Philippines has required writing down the names of individual candidates. This has created problems especially during synchronized elections when voters have to write down anywhere from 32 to 44 names on the ballot.
Another set of problems occurs as a result of the long period required for counting and canvassing of votes cast. Votes are counted by hand at the precinct level, then precinct returns canvassed at the municipal level, municipal returns at the provincial level, and only then added up at the COMELEC in Manila, a process that can take over a month. Elections are supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), a constitutionally mandated, independent body. Although it is supposed to be an independent body, the COMELEC is invariably accused of being pro-administration in nearly every election.
Parties are required to register with the COMELEC with a verified petition with attachments including a constitution, by-laws, platform, and such other information as may be required by the COMELEC. They are required to have chapters in a majority of regions, and within each region, a majority of provinces, down to towns and barangays. Cheating is a well-developed art in Philippine elections. Local politicians are adept at manipulating the process from beginning to end.
Cheating begins during the registration process when politicians work to remove supporters of competitors and pad the voters list with 'flying voters' (those who vote more than once in several precincts). During the campaign 'guns, goons, and gold' are used extensively to intimidate competitors' supporters, and to literally buy support. Cheating does not end at the time of the actual election. Election return canvassers, often public school teachers are bribed to manipulate the results. If cheating before and during the election is 'retail' cheating, at the canvassing stage it is 'wholesale' cheating which occurs. If cheating is a normal part of elections, so is protesting election results.
Politicians say there are only two kinds of candidates in the Philippines, winners and those who are cheated. In the 1995 senatorial elections, a sophisticated nationwide network for dagdag-bawas (adding-subtracting) resulted in the election of reportedly as many as three senators who would not have won otherwise. One of those edged out of the winning slate, former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, filed a protest with the COMELEC. Based on a recount of only 15 percent of the precincts identified by Pimentel as those where dagdag-bawas occurred, at least two of the winning senators should already be removed. But because the recount process takes forever Pimentel believes that the COMELEC will not push the issue further.
This electoral system, and the actual practice of elections have been one of the most important factors shaping political parties. The intensely personalized character of parties derive partly from the fact that individual candidates are elected in a 'first past the post' system. 'During elections, it is not so much the political parties that are the real mobilizing organizations but the candidate's electoral machinery and network of relatives, friends, political associates and allies.' (David, 1994:1) Because at the base of the electoral system, the municipality, the power and status of families are at stake, all means are availed of including cheating and violence to achieve victory.
The Philippine president appoints a large number of people in the bureaucracy, over a hundred thousand positions by some estimates. Local politicians, anxious to find positions in the bureaucracy for their followers, have to lobby with the president. Since officials appointed by the president often have the power to appoint their own staff, the patronage opportunities available in this process are extensive and crucial for local politicians. The main intermediaries in this process are congressmen. The president's control over government finances is similarly extensive.
Although Congress theoretically has the 'power of the purse', the President's line item veto, and control over disbursement gives him much greater power than Congress. Congress persons are adept at allocating themselves large amounts of pork barrel. In the 1990's, pork barrel is euphemistically called 'Countryside Development Funds', amounts allocated equally to members of both the House and the Senate, and congressional insertions in the budgets of government departments (called CIA's, Congressional Initiative Allocations) which, by agreement, congress persons can allocate. None of these amounts can be availed of unless the President disburses them.
This system of allocation of power gives the President and his political party a hold on local politicians. It is one of the most important reasons why political parties have difficulty maintaining their membership. Soon after a presidential election, members of opposition parties gravitate to the party of the president. When the Ninth Congress convened in 1992, LDP had 81 out of 204 members in the House, and 16 out of 24 senators. They soon lost 47 congressmen and three senators. In 1997, LDP had only 7 senators left. Even more local government officials have moved into the ruling Lakas-NUCD. In July 1995, after the May 1995 national and local elections, then Speaker Jose De Venecia claimed that as much as 93 percent of all elected positions were controlled by the Lakas-NUCD and its allied parties.
The ability of a president to allocate rewards to provincial factions is, at the same time, one of the main factors limiting the strength and long term growth of a party's power. The new administration attracts more and more factions often with conflicting claims until the time comes when the number of factions who get disappointed because its allocation is less than it expected is greater than those who are satisfied. At this point, usually in the run-up to the next presidential election, members of the ruling party start moving to the party of the presidential candidate with the greatest chance of winning. This pattern of behavior is also the reason for the pre-election maneuvers of the ruling Lakas-NUCD. By raising the possibility that Pres. Ramos would remain president after the May 1998 election by amending the Constitution to enable him to circumvent the term limit, Lakas-NUCD prevented its members from moving to the opposition. In September 1997, only eight months before the May 1998 presidential election, the direction of movement of politicians was still towards the Lakas-NUCD.
The powerful presidency combined with weak parties has meant that the initiation of government policy has mainly been in the hands of the president. This does not mean that the legislature is completely powerless in policy-making. The particularities of the legislative process in the Philippines, a process shaped over almost seventy years of practice, determines the character of executive-legislative dynamic and the role of political parties. While the majority party can control leadership in both houses, opposition congress persons who have long experience in Congress tend to have powerful committee chairmanships. Negotiation on policy issues of national significance, more often than not, cut across party lines.
In between elections, party headquarters are usually at the party leader's home or office. The party candidate for president and the key national players in the party have the most say in candidate selection down to local candidates. The centralization of the process of candidate selection has increased in recent years because of two developments: one, the synchronized national and local elections mandated by the 1987 Constitution, and second, the increasing importance of money in elections.
Synchronized elections make local candidates dependent on national candidates and their parties in contrast to the past where local officials, already in place in local elections held earlier, are needed by national candidates in subsequent national elections. Although local candidates still have to have their own campaign resources, the rapidly increasing cost of election campaigns have made national party organizations stronger because they have more access to larger pools of campaign donations. Following Pres. Aquino's example in the 1992 elections, Pres. Ramos 'anointed' Lower House Speaker Jose De Venecia as Lakas-NUCD presidential candidate. To soften the undemocratic image generated by 'anointment', Lakas organized two 'consultations' of party members.
In the midst of the second consultation, however, the party leadership decided to undercut the process and leave the selection of the party's national candidates to Pres. Ramos. Pres. Ramos and Speaker De Venecia have also played key roles in determining Lakas candidates for local positions especially in situations where two or more party members contested the same position. Candidates are selected on the basis of their performance, political machinery, popularity (name recall/public acceptance), geographical base/support, adequate financial resources.
The importance of these elements vary from national to local candidates. For national candidates, it is generally accepted that if the presidential candidate comes from Luzon and its Tagalog speaking population, the vice presidential candidate has to come from the Visayas and its Cebuano speaking people. Popularity, increasingly determined by performance in surveys, is more important for national than local candidates. For local candidates clan/family connections are very important.
While sectoral groups do not play important roles within political parties, they are increasingly perceived to be important for mobilizing votes especially for national positions. Because presidential candidate Joseph Estrada's PMP is a minuscule party, his campaign handlers started organizing a parallel organization called JEEP which has fancy words in its meaning but is generally known as the 'Joseph Ejercito Estrada for President' movement. Although other presidential candidates have tried to organize similar groups, JEEP is generally recognized to be way ahead of the pack. Stronger parties see less need for parallel organizations targeting sectoral organizations, preferring instead to win over leaders of these organizations with bribes and favors. Because of its extensive organization among local politicians, Lakas has not made much of an effort to organize a sectoral base.
Running election campaigns have become so expensive that only rich people or those dependent on rich financiers can run. Qualified, popular candidates without money and without financial backers cannot win. Even when relatively honest people do win, they have to spend so much money to campaign that they invariably become corrupt in order to recover their expenses or to return the favor of financial backers. Since patronage demands continue, in fact, increase after the candidate is elected, using the powers of one's office to reward supporters is a basic requirement in Philippine politics. 'All the congressional respondents mentioned honesty as an important criterion for public judgment but conversations indicated this to be a particular kind of honesty owed only in relation to one's supporters rather than the electorate at large.
A politician must deliver what he has agreed to produce for political support. He is in no way beholden to those who did not support him.' This group loyalty does not apply to political parties, only to individual political leaders. (David, 1994:1) To win Philippine elections, candidates have to spend thrice: once to get nominated, second to garner votes, third to get his votes counted, added to, and those of his opponents subtracted. To gain the support of lower level leaders in support of his/her nomination by the party, then to organize the campaign, candidates have to spend prodigious amounts of money.
The higher up the ladder, culminating in the presidential candidate, the more you have to spend. In the 1995 elections, COMELEC municipal and provincial registrars were bribed to add votes to some senatorial candidates and subtract votes from those of their nearest competitors. In the 1992 presidential elections, candidates were allowed to spend P10 per voter. With 32,144,330 registered voters, each presidential candidate was allowed to spend a total of P321 million (US$1-28). As high as this amount is, most analysts say candidates spent more, in the area of P1B per candidate. Fulfilling COMELEC requirements, after the election Ramos reported that he spent P118 million and his party, Lakas another P98,981,281. Kilosbayan, a citizens movement headed by former senator Jovito Salonga later accused the Aquino government of spending P400 million in government funds to support Ramos' candidacy. Laws on financial contributions refer specifically to elections. They are silent on contributions to political parties not related directly to elections.
These laws are so strict that if they were observed, candidates would have to self-finance campaigns. In any case, they are virtually impossible to implement. The COMELEC has no capability to validate or to dig into the business affiliations of individual contributors. Even when violations do occur, the COMELEC does not apply sanctions. The party itself is almost always not a source of electoral funds. Every candidate must raise his own funds - from his family, friends, business associates, and from political allies.
As campaign expenses have increased exponentially, national party organizations have taken on the task of raising money in Manila and distributing it to local candidates. These national party funds, however, cover only part of the campaign expenses of local candidates. The ruling party has a distinct advantage in campaign fund raising. It can tap government resources - financial, human institutional. In addition to government funds, the ruling party is also better placed to secure contributions from business sources because of the party’s control over government contracts, licenses and other favors.
Lakas reportedly has been accumulating a “war chest” many years before the 1998 elections. There are reports, however, that three months for the elections, Lakas is having difficulty getting new money from business sources because of the currency crisis and the perception that De Venecia is a weak candidate for president. Election funds are either “legitimate” money or “grey” money. “Legitimate money” comes from businesses, especially from Chinese businessmen who “are more politically vulnerable and more prone to use cash to buy certain favors and business advantages.” While corporate contributors, among others from the Makati Business Club are known sources, Chinese businessmen contribute more and make less demands. “Grey” money comes from the operators of illegal economic activities.
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