Challenging Kant's Moral Theory of Freedom and Liberty

In his 1793 essay ‘On the common saying: “This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice” Kant outlies his view of the relation between morality and liberty and the role freedom plays within both these concepts. This essay will examine how Kant develops his moral theory by using the idea of freedom as a necessity for beings to be rational and subsequently have the ability to be morally autonomous. It will then explore various thinker’s criticisms of this view and how Kant would respond to these challenges. Later, it moves on to Kant’s notion of liberty and how there is a distinction between being worthy of happiness and actually making somebody happy and how the role of the civic state deals with this difference and subsequently uses coercion as a means of promoting freedom and liberty. Allison (1986) argues that Kant forms a reciprocal link in his works between freedom and morality and this essay will back that claim up.

Kant’s moral theory of freedom centres on the idea that human beings are not only rational but morally autonomous beings. Kant defines the human will as “a kind of causality belonging to living beings so far as they are rational” (Kant cited in Bantock 1984: 150). Kant argues for humans to have a purely rational will they must “pull away from our intuitions and emotions and thus become absolutely free from influences to decide what the right duty to fulfil is” (Gregor 1996 :14). Therefore, to describe the will as free would be to say, “it could act causally without being caused to do so by something other than itself” (Kant 2005: 98). Kant argues that having a rational will, which is not influenced by that around us, gives us the ability to create laws based purely on our own reasoning and become self-governing beings.

Kant’s notion of freedom based on rationality can be seen to be both positively and negatively constructed. Isiah Berlin (1969) described negative freedom as “the absence of coercion” (1969: 24) and as previously mentioned Kant argued that it is fundamental for the notion of rationality that an individual is free to make their own choices; highlighting Berlin’s concept of negative freedom. However, Kant’s ideas also give rise to a positive notion of freedom, which Berlin defines as “self-mastery” (Berlin cited in Nelson 2005: 58). As Kant sees rational humans as not only being free from pressure but having the ability to follow rules that they set themselves this brings about a positive notion of liberty.

This freedom can be translated into autonomy as mentioned above as Kant defines it as “choosing only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same volition” (Kant cited in Korsgaard 1985: 308). As an individual is free to act without external pressure and based on their rationality, they have the ability to make their own laws which they abide by. However, for these laws to be universal each individual has to be bound by them and choose to follow them in the future. Kant develops this into the first formulation of his categorical imperative, in which he states every individual should “act that the principle of one’s act could become a universal law” (Kant 1997: 30). Here Kant is stating that when individuals act using reason then their actions are worthy of moral law. Kant argues these laws cannot come through experience but have to be based on reason. This is because experience is necessarily contingent; therefore, no universal or necessary conclusions can be drawn from it. Whereas for Kant human reason has the ability to create necessary as each individual can come to the same conclusion of what is a rightful law to follow.

Freedom is central for Kant’s view of not only making laws but also of acting morally as he “presupposes that we are free in the sense we have the ability to act” (Kant cited in Wellman 2010: 67) because otherwise if we cannot be held responsible for our actions we cannot be held accountable for the results these actions may cause. He gives the example of a thief and states that for his actions to be morally wrong, he must have the option to commit this crime. As humans are intrinsically free to act how they wish, and therefore free to commit crimes, Kant (1785) develops the second formulation of his categorical imperative as he states through humanities freedom individuals have the ability to use others as merely ends. However, Kant believes that there should be a “kingdom of ends” (Kant cited in Rawls 1971: 264) in which all citizens are at once the “authors and subjects of all laws” (Ibid: 270), and this society would be a perfect one in which there is mutual respect for every individual. Kant develops his doctrine by arguing there is a duty on rational humans to “live up to the moral laws that our own free will has set” (Kant 2005: 41). This follows that as individuals abide by the law they are acting both morally and freely at the same time.

Schopenhauer (1840), challenges Kant’s view that moral laws come solely through rationality. He argues that “human conduct is guided sometimes by emotions such as sympathy for other people and other times by selfish or egotistic concerns for oneself” (Schopenhauer 1818: 52). He goes on to argue that contrary to Kant’s view, truly moral conduct, must be sympathetic. Whilst Kant sees emotion as unreliable, Schopenhauer sees some emotions such as sympathy necessary for keeping other emotions such as egoism intact. Although, Fieser defends Kant’s theory by stating that “there is a humanitarian emphasis within human reason” (Fieser 2001: 182). Despite, an individual’s emotion such as sympathy not being the only influence in Kantian ethics, it does form part of human reason. As Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative does state to treat humans as ends instead of mean’s this does counter Schopenhauer’s argument as it shows emotions such as sympathy and gives worth to positive human emotions when making decisions.

Overall, Kant’s moral theory of freedom is heavily based on the idea that humans have the ability to act rationally and not be influenced by outside causes. When humans act in this way they have the ability to be self-legislating and treat each other as ends instead of means. To be moral humans must follow these laws they set for not only themselves but for everyone around them in what becomes a ‘kingdom of ends’.

Walker (2001) also contests Kant’s moral theory of freedom by stating “equating freedom with moral law leads to the absurdity that no free action can be wrong” (Walker cited in Scruton 2001: 14). If a human being follows all the moral law, which by definition is “what I universally ought to do, and thus morally correct, this excludes the possibility of me ever being in the wrong, as a free agent” (Ibid: 61). Walker, also attacks Kant for stating in his Lectures on Ethics, “that a person who steals for material necessity is less responsible of theft than a wealthy person that steals” (Kant cited in Walker 1998: 89). This does seem like a reasonable claim, but it is not compatible with Kant’s theory of freedom where two noumenal agents have the same degree of freedom. Bennett sums up Walkers argument by stating that “we are left with the dubious equation between moral law and freedom which leads, to the absurdity that either no free agent is ever wrong or that almost no one is actually free” (Bennett 1976: 223). Kant would argue back that to be free is still to be moral, however we are not free when we “give into the temptations surrounding us on a day to day basis” (Ibid: 219). At this point we are not acting rationally and therefore going against the moral law, so for Kant humans can still act immorally even when they appear to be free by giving in to these ‘desires’.

Kant’s theory of liberty is also established in his work On the Common saying when he defines liberty as the ability “to seek his happiness in whatever way seems best to him” (Kant cited in Allison 1986: 490). “In Kant’s terms happiness with one’s life is an apodictic end, since happiness is just a name for being suitably satisfied with pursuing and achieving one’s goals” (Melnick 2008: 71). Westphal (2005) argues that this idea of non-interference in Kant’s notion of liberty fits in with Kant’s notion of the moral law and shows the importance of freedom once again in Kant’s writings. Kant has already demonstrated that the source of all moral obligation is the rational will, which prescribes universal laws independently of experience. For Kant it is freedom alone that gives worth to human beings, as freedom allows an individual to have a rational will. Therefore, for Kant it is preposterous to interfere with another’s pursuit of happiness, as it interferes with their freedom which for Kant is the very essence of being a human. In Critique of Practical Reason Kant argues that despite happiness being universally pursued, it is “not specific enough to entail any particular universal desires in human beings” (Beiser 1992: 31). As desires are empirical and contingent, they cannot form the basis of any pure moral law as one’s happiness is not universalised. Therefore, for there to be a ‘universal principle of right’ which helps promote Kant’s definition of liberty as pursuit of happiness it must be based on something universal such as freedom, which Kant describes as “the only one innate right” (Kant 1991: 81) Kant sees the role of the state to therefore, establish a maxim not of happiness but of freedom “for we are not concerned here with any happiness which the subject might expect to derive from the institutions…of the commonwealth, but primarily with the rights which would be secured for everyone” (Kant cited in Reiss 1991: 80). The role of the state can therefore be seen to help individuals be ‘worthy of happiness’ rather than telling them ‘how to be happy’, as Kant argues “a state cannot legitimately impose any particular conception of happiness upon its citizens as this conception can never be universal because of the very nature of happiness” (Ibid: 91).

“Kant therefore insisted that the role of the state is only to ensure freedom, to provide those arrangements that enable each person to pursue what each sees as in his or her best personal interests within the limits of rights” (Gregor 1997: 78). However, this liberty offered by the state can only provide humans the ability to become happy it cannot make them happy, as happiness is contingent and therefore it would be impossible for the state to create conditions where every individual is happy. It can again be seen the similarities between Kant’s notions of moral freedom and liberty as both requires humans to have not had external pressure applied to them and backs up Allison’s (1986) claim that Kant creates this reciprocal link.

Kant sees the role of the civil state to foster co-existence with one another, so that individuals have the ability to pursue their own notion of happiness. Despite, arguing earlier that the moral law can never be coercively applied, Kant argues that political order must be. In Doctrine of Right Kant contends that an “individual follows the law because of two incentives: ethical and juridical” (Kant 199`: 129). As humans have the ability to be influenced by their surroundings, Kant argues that there has to be some form of punishment to prevent individuals infringing on others freedom. This comes in the form of coercive laws which act as a deterrent to individuals to infringe upon other rights, for example coming back to the thief analogy individuals have to be punished for their actions as otherwise they have the ability to disrupt others happiness. Therefore, although Kant argues that humans have the ability to act rationally there are still a number of temptations which can convince people to act immorally.

Despite, coercion seemingly hindering negative freedom, Kant argues that it can be justified based on the fact that it can be used to prevent other rights violations and can therefore be seen to be a “hindrance to a hindrance to freedom” (Ripstein 2008: 12). Entering into a political union has a number of benefits according Kant. Hoffe believed that Kant defended “a government, as the only means to achieving a lasting peace that is permanent and unconditional” (Hoffe 2006: 10). Taylor also built on this by arguing that a political union allows humans to live under the law and “representing a common recognition of our common subjection to the law” (Taylor 1984: 81). Therefore, it seems here that Kant is willing to sacrifice some notion of Berlin’s negative freedom to help promote individual liberty. However, Kant only does this because he feels the benefits of a political union will help develop society as a whole. Danto disputes Kant’s idea of coercion by stating that “we can never be free as long as we are coerced” (Danto 2008, 210). Danto’s argument is based on his notion that freedom can only come from within and true freedom will never come from external factors. This is a direct challenge to Kant as his notion of coercion is central to his arguments for political freedom and therefore his notion of morality and liberty. However, Fowler counters Danto by arguing that we need “to see coercion in relation to our understanding of how practical reason works” (Fowler 1982: 330), and that coercion does not simply leave us with no choice, but it should show us the right choice and that “if the coerce chooses otherwise than that the coercer demands this would be against practical reason” (Ibid: 376). Therefore, coercion can still allow for freedom and choice, its role should be to help individuals make the right decisions and as mentioned earlier should give individuals the opportunities to become ‘worthy of happiness’. Berman develops this argument for the need for coercion by arguing that “despite human will not able to be inclined to follow a certain action, laws can be made to help individuals to follow to the moral law” (Berman 2006:51). It can subsequently be argued that Danto’s definition of coercion is a far harsher one than that of Fowler and Berman. They argue that coercion helps develop society as a whole by showing individuals which is the right choice rather than purely forcing them into a way of living.

In conclusion, this essay has clearly shown that Allison’s claim that Kant forms a reciprocal link between morality and freedom is true. Kant’s moral theory hinges on humans being free and therefore rational, and also having the ability to not only abide by laws but also to create them. These laws are not only moral because they come from rational humans but because they protect individual rights as they treat humans as means rather than ends. This freedom is linked with Kant’s ideas of liberty because for Kant liberty is about pursing whatever makes an individual happy. As each individual is different it would be impossible for a state to make every person happy, but it does have the power to put in place the necessary laws to allow humans to seek happiness. Kant therefore allows a small infringement on individuals freedom in the form of coercive law, as Kant does not see this as an infringement but a way of actually creating the means for humans to be happy. Despite, some critics arguing that freedom does not always equate to being moral and coercive law not promoting individual rights. Kant’s arguments can withstand this criticisms by explaining the need for these restraints and how freedom leads to rationality which subsequently forms the basis for the moral law. Therefore, I believe that Kant is successful in his argument that morality and liberty do form the basis of one another, and that the moral law helps us to chase our own variations of happiness.