Analysis Of The Concepts Brought Up In Immanuel Kant's Groundwork Of The Metaphysics Of Morals

In this paper, I will defend an interpretation of Kant’s Singularity Thesis: the claim that the formula of the Categorical Imperative is in fact a representation of a single and an underlying law. I will proceed by first looking at (a) The underlying law (b) The relationship between the formula of universal law, the formula of humanity and the formula of autonomy. I will argue that these formulae are three ways of expressing, thinking about, or applying the Categorical Imperative which is understood as Kant’s statement of the supreme principle of morality which corresponds to three features of rational agency.

Kant’s task in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS) is to explain the concept of moral obligation, which he defines as “the necessity of a free action under a categorical imperative” (GMS 6:222). Obligation expresses the “moral ought”: the idea that a free, rational agent can be bound to act in a certain way. For Kant, all obligation is grounded in duty–the representation of an action as necessary by virtue of its conformity to a rational law. Kant identifies and corroborated the “supreme principle of morality”–that rational law underlying all moral obligation, and the first principle of an a priori investigation of morality which he calls a “metaphysics of morals” (GMS 4:392). What he arrived at, the Categorical Imperative is the backbone of his ethics and one of the most important developments in moral philosophy. It expresses a basic requirement for a principle to be obligating for a rational agent–for a principle to function as a moral law.

In the second section of the Groundwork, Kant derives three further principles–what he calls the “formulae” of the Categorical Imperative, the Formula of Universal Law (GMS 4:421); the Formula of Humanity (GMS 4:429), and the Formula of Autonomy (GMS 4:434). These three laws are ways of representing a single law. So, what is the relationship between these formulae and the Categorical Imperative they are supposed to express?

I will say, however, is to understand what exactly the Singularity Thesis means. How can I best interpret the claim that the formulae are singular – three ways of expressing one law? In defense of the Singularity Thesis, I will explain several potentially difficult elements of Kant’s moral philosophy.

First, the Formula of Universal Law is purely a formal constraint on action; it determines only the minimum standard for what can count as a moral maxim. The maxim “I will make a promise without keeping it” is ruled out by the Formula of Universal Law because the form of the principle is inadequate; it cannot be universalized without rendering its own concepts absurd. The Formula of Universal Law does not, however, tell us anything about what should be valued or pursued in our actions.

Second, the Formula of Humanity, on the other hand, places a substantive constraint on action. It sets a supreme limiting condition on the ends I pursue and the means by which I pursue them. The maxim “I will steal from my neighbor to benefit my family” is ruled out by the Formula of Humanity because it proposes to use another human being for the furtherance of my interests. It uses a human as a “mere means.” The Formula of Humanity proposes something we should aim to achieve–something that should have value for us. Therefore, I will say that the Formula of Universal Law is not a merely empty principle as some people might infer; since it does posit a thing to value, it will really determine us to act or set our moral obligations.

Third, the Formula of Autonomy concludes that rational agents are bound to the moral law by their own will. The fundamental similarity between the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity is primarily responsible for the immediate impression that these laws can possibly be unified and reduced to one.

Furthermore, the Singularity Thesis claims that this is the case that despite their apparent incompatibility, the Formula of Universal Law, the Formula of Humanity and the Formula of Autonomy are just expressions of a single law. According to the Singularity Thesis, these formulas are in fact undergirded by a single law.

In defense of this thesis, I will argue that we ought to identify the Categorical Imperative with the supreme principle of morality as Kant states it in Groundwork: “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (GMS 4:421). This principle is identical to the Formula of Universal Law.

Kant claims that the formulae all express the “very same law.” I will argue, then, that the ground of the formulae is the mere concept of a categorical imperative. By this understanding, the Formula of Universal Law, the Formula of Humanity and the Formula of Autonomy would be formulae of the same law in the sense that they each satisfy Kant’s criteria for a principle to be a law–universal applicability (GMS 4:421). To argue in the contrary will result in two significant problems. First, this identification of the underlying law produces a woefully unsatisfying notion of singularity. On this account, the various formulae are singular because their form is consistent with Kant’s characterization of a law–not because they are three statements of one law.

To illustrate this notion of singularity, consider the following example. Any constitutional government is undergirded by a set of edicts which determine the minimum requirements for something to qualify as a law. Imagine one such society with the three following laws: (a) It is forbidden to steal from others, (b) It is forbidden to do bodily harm to animals, and (c) It is forbidden to drive any vehicle without good tires. All these three laws conform to the state’s constitution, so they must fulfill the requirements it deems necessary for law hood.

These laws, then, are singular in the same way that the account takes Kant’s formulae to be singular between the formulae. One should notice something from this account: while the hypothetical laws all meet the baseline requirement for Law hood, their content is entirely disparate. Each law sets an obligation, and no two obligations are related; the laws form a system of obligations, but this system is derivable only by considering the set of token laws in its entirety. This is exactly how Kant intends the formulae to be singular.

Second, the identification of “the very same law” with the concept of a law is textually consistent. The claim that the formulae are representations of the same law is not distinct from the claim that the formulae are equally consistent with Kant’s characterization of a moral law. The former concept seems to obviously imply the latter; such that the formulae can be shown to be an expression of a selfsame law in unison and, which also satisfy the conceptual requirement of a law.

Let me now consider and identify the underlying law. It may be helpful here to recall the place of the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork and in Kant’s moral philosophy in its entirety. The Categorical Imperative expresses the most basic requirements for a principle to be obligating–to be moral laws. Any moral law must be universally binding. It is important, when considering the formulae of the Categorical Imperative, to remember what the formulae are supposed to be. If we do not take them, for instance, to precisely and thoroughly determine the set of “right actions,” then we risk misunderstanding Kant’s ethics at its most fundamental level. “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (GMS 4:421).

One good interpretation is that, on this reading, the formula of universal law seems to be identical with the law it is supposedly a formula of. Kant states the formula of universal law thus, “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (GMS 4:421). If we do not accept the identification of the Categorical Imperative with the supreme principle, then the formula of universal law seems to be a mere restatement of the law it is supposed to be a formula of.

To fend off this challenge, I must either deny that the formula of universal law is really a formula of itself, or accept that the formula of universal law is a formula of itself, and understand this in such a way as to make this unproblematic–or perhaps inevitable. I believe that the latter approach is appropriate. Therefore, Kant is correct in his assertion that there is “only a single categorical imperative.” In defense of these formulations by Kant, I have also shown how the formulations can be unified.

In conclusion, I brought this idea to the forefront and attempted to defend and provided a convincing interpretation which is consistent with Kant’s arguments in the Groundwork. The Singularity Thesis is, I believe, central to the goal of the Groundwork. The formulae express three distinct principles which determine duty–specifically prohibited duties–in subjectively different ways.

In addition, competent moral appraisal seems to require mastery of each formula–including and most importantly, an appreciation of their subjective difference and what unifies them. Therefore, it is important that I retain the distinction between the laws and how these formulations are unified. However, it is equally crucial for the internal consistency of Kant’s work that the three formulae can in fact be singularly identified with the Categorical Imperative.