Analysis of Mission Command and Operation Anaconda

Mission command allows commanders to use authority and direction when executing orders and empowering leaders during unified land operations (ADRP 6-0). Mission command is the foundation for unified land operations, and parallel with the Army’s operation concept. In mid-January 2002, Major General Franklin Hagenbeck exercises the mission command concept, when he leads the Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain into Shahikot Valley, Afghanistan. General Hagenbeck’ mission task was to root out enemy Taliban and al Qaeda forces that gathered in Shahikot Valley. Operation Anaconda provides examples of the pros and cons of mission command. This operation follows clear and concise commander’s intent. The use of mission orders allows ground troops to exercise discipline initiative, while accepting prudent risk, to adapt the plan as the battle develops to defeat the enemy forces. These positive factors enable the leadership to overcome building cohesive teams through mutual trust and creating a shared understanding.

Operation Anaconda lacked cohesive team building through mutual trust. The air and ground components lacked trust and did not have Air Support Operations Center. Without an air component, the task force “lacked a critical command and control node that should have integrated with ground maneuver” (Isherwood, p. 142). However, the task force commander decided his command would not need airpower, therefore excluding an air component commander in planning. The task force leadership’s failure to understand the battlefield effects airpower could bring had a detrimental impact on the operation. This omission cost the early stages of battle and made the integration of close air support difficult.

In addition, there was no trust between U.S. and Afghan troops, over whom the U.S. military leadership had no command authority. These shortcomings further hampered the building of a cohesive team; a huge problem as the battle unfolded. Leaders had to adapt to the ever-changing battlefield situation without the integration and cohesion of the Afghan soldiers. In fact, the Afghan soldiers “were not organized into a formal force. Nor were they trained for maneuver-and-fire operations typically performed by combat units” (Kugler, p. 13).

The absence of shared understanding of the operational environment between the air and ground components as well as between the U.S. and Afghan Soldiers was evident within Operation Anaconda. An air component and the Afghan soldiers were not integrated into the battle planning. The original plan outlined air components to airlift supplies and provide aircraft for a limited number of targets. This changed dramatically as the battle developed and the Afghan troops withdrew from the battle.

Leaders on the ground used the clear and concise commander’s intent along with mission orders to overcome these shortcomings by exercising disciplined initiative; turning the battle in their favor. The troops were able to develop a plan for massing fires on dug in enemy positions with close air support because they understood the commander’s intent. This was essential when the operation “did not unfold as planned” (ADRP 6-0, p.2-3).

The use of mission orders allows subordinates maximum freedom of action in determining how best to accomplish missions. “In theory, mission-type orders, with clear commanders’ intent, can help clarify battlefield goals and actions, provide a proper basis for centralized direction and decentralized execution, and facilitate Joint force integration” (Kugler, Baranick, and Binnendijk, p. 27). During Operation Anaconda, the turning point in the battle occurred when subordinates adapted when the battle did not develop as projected. This flexibility was crucial to success for allowing battlefield leaders to exercise disciplined initiative during the assault. This permitted decentralized execution and facilitated improved integration between air and ground components.

The exercise of disciplined initiative can become “the starting point for seizing the tactical advantage” when unforeseen opportunities arise (ADRP 6-0, p. 2-4). The leaders seized the opportunity to use close air support to concentrate fires on enemy positions and destroy them. The types of aircraft and fire support they could use adapted. Targets were prioritized and chosen aircraft transported mortars to the deployed ground forces.

The acceptance of prudent risk was also a good example of mission command during the operation. Leaders on the ground accepted risk by using close air support danger close to friendly troops, even though they were unfamiliar with the process and had no prior integration or planning. “The willingness to accept prudent risk is often the key to exposing enemy weaknesses” (ADRP 6-0, p.2-5) and during Operation Anaconda, this exposed an enemy weakness and that battlefield leaders were able to exploit for the win.

Operation Anaconda was successful due to a clear commander’s intent, the use of mission orders, accepting prudent risk, and the use of disciplined initiative. These behaviors granted the task force to adapt as the battle developed and the initial plan failed. It overcame the missteps of not building cohesive teams through mutual trust and the lack of a shared understanding of the operational environment. The positive and negative examples of mission command showcased in Operation Anaconda proved to push Coalition Forces ahead of the game in spite of its breakdowns.

References

1. Andres, Richard B. and Hukill, Jeffrey B. (2007, 4th Quarter). Anaconda: A Flawed Join Planning Process. Retrieved, from http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/apj-s/2009/3tri09/andreseng.htm
2. Isherwood, Michael W. (2007). Five Years After Operation Anaconda: Challenges and Opportunities. NDU Press, (Volume 47).
3. Kugler, Richard. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle. Case Studies in Defense Transformation (Number 5).
4. Kugler, Richard L., Barack, Michael, and Binnendijk, Hans. (2009). Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations. National Defense University.
5. Headquarters Department of the Army. (2012). ADRP 6-0: Mission Command.