Analysis of Crimea Crisis and Why It Strengthened Russian Nationalism

Introduction

The year 2014 undoubtedly marked a watershed in the history of modern Russia. Following closely the long-standing domestic political turmoil in Ukraine, the Kremlin decided to take action based solely on real and/or perceived threats to their national security interests: in late February, well-organized and armed soldiers without insignia (who became known as ‘little green men’) appeared on the Crimean Peninsula and secured locations of strategic importance thereby helping the pro-Russian demonstrators to first of all, declare the independence of the Republic of Crimea, then to organize a referendum on 16 March 2014, whether to join the Russian Federation or not.

Though evidence suggests that the overwhelming results of this referendum have been extensively manipulated, the Russian State Duma recognized the newly declared independent entity, and on 18 March 2014, officially accepted the admission of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as federal subjects of the Russian Federation.

Though this process constituted a serious breach on Ukraine’s territorial integrity, national sovereignty and political independence under international law, including previous written security guarantees specifically from Russia (such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum), the move enjoyed almost unanimous support from Russian public. The independent non- governmental research and polling organization Levada Center measured 84-90% in favour of the annexation throughout the year 2014 (Levada, 2015). Another generally acknowledged development and direct consequence of the annexation was the boost in the approval rating of President Putin, which numbers were 69% in February 2014, but from the date of the annexation in March 2014 they did not fall under 80% until February 2018 (Levada, 2019).

Apparently, the annexation triggered widespread international objection and condemnation, and resulted in continuous sanctions, and a general deterioration in Russia’s relationship with the EU and NATO countries, while in the Russian Federation it had a rally-around-the-flag effect and general boost in public understanding, regardless of the consequences. This paper aims to look at nationalism in Russia building upon the notion of Taras Kuzio that conflicts transform national identities and attitudes of countries (Kuzio 2015, 157.).

The core statement of this paper is that among scholars there appears to be a general understanding about the decisive significance the annexation of Crimea has brought in the discourse about Russian nationalism and identity. This writing will focus on two main interrelated subtopics: firstly, how Crimea is perceived in Russia, the portrayal of the annexation and how that affected Russian nationalism in general. Secondly, the inevitably related perspective of the state, i.e. what the annexation meant for the Kremlin, especially for President Putin and what their followed and how the popularity of Crimea can be a highly beneficial and useful tool for Russian political leadership.

This paper aims to explore academic discussion regarding the statements that the annexation of Crimea brought a new chapter for Russian nationalism, as it will present how that contributed greatly to the Kremlin’s patriotic propaganda and also played a significant role in new state-led policies concerning identity. The paper will also compare and contrast different argumentations of the authors and will aim to introduce some less ‘mainstream’ aspects of the topic, like the digital sphere or the point of view of ethnic minorities in Russia.

Finally, the academic literature on nationalism in Russia, especially after 2014 is not generic at all, which makes comparing arguments difficult, since in many cases the authors are focusing on a specific aspect of the topic, and not really the wider context. Therefore, it would seem right for this paper to adapt to this phenomenon and first and foremost try to incorporate the different aspects to be able to give a comprehensive account.

Public Opinion and Nationalism

In order to have a profound understanding of the symbolism of Crimea we need to go back in time. Russian history has had several crucial moments related to the peninsula over the centuries, thereby weaving strong emotional ties to the place. As Mikhail Suslov argues, the ‘first annexation’ of the Crimea in 1783 by Catherine the Great gave new dimensions to the Russian Empire, a new North-South axis and a sense of belonging to Europe (Suslov 2014, 591.).

The Russian defeat in the Crimean War (1853-56) was also a lasting historical memory of decisive importance on Russia, but probably the most crucial historical event was the decision by First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev in 1954 to give Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Furthermore, the perception about the collapse of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical trauma is intensified by the sacred places (linked to Cyril, Methodius or Saint Prince Vladimir) that were ‘lost’ because of that (Suslov 2014, 592.). This interpretation of ‘spiritual linkages’ is supported by the Russian state and the Orthodox church as well.

Therefore, from a historical perspective the year 2014 was indeed a turning point for Russian nationalists, also pertaining to their room for manoeuvre (Laine 2017, 222.). However, what is not in the focus of Suslov’s aforementioned paper is the introduction of different nationalist groups. Suslov’s article is somewhat unique since its focus is on the digital sphere, social media and Russian blogs and he does not differentiate between any groups with possibly various backgrounds and makes the point that a certain geopolitical-oriented narrative is the most common online.

He is clearly right about that online users can “distance themselves from morality and the law of nations when speaking about the annexation of Crimea” (Suslov 2014, 598.), nevertheless, his analysis lacks mentioning the role of pro-Kremlin trolls and bots when mapping out the digital general sentiment (though he writes about the spread of the hashtag #Кpымнaш in social media, which translates to ‘Crimea is ours’).

Therefore, it is very important to clarify and refine the narrative to avoid the false impression that there is a unified opinion in the Russian public. Regarding the various nationalist groups, Veera Laine’s paper about nationalist movements is a substantial work, also presenting the transformation among nationalists triggered by the annexation and that there is no such thing as a unified Russian nationalist movement, and Laine also argues that the case of Crimea actually brought more new dividing lines, especially that the space about identity and ideology nationalist movements were sharing with the state was entirely reshuffled with the annexation (Laine 2017, 226-233).

Laine distinguishes three main nationalist factions: imperial, national-democratic and liberal nationalist groups, but points out that what they have in common in this regard is that the annexation was supported by all three though having dissimilar stance on for instance the Euromaidan protests, which disunity also weakened nationalists. In another article, Marlene Laruelle makes a very similar point by stating that the crisis in Ukraine “shattered the ideological status quo” of the Russian nationalists by creating a newfound competition. She distinguishes three main impacts, the first being the same conclusion about the divisiveness of interpretations of the Euromaidan protests.

Secondly, she writes about the unanimous support for the annexation, even among pro-Maidan figures based on the self-deception about the ‘right of self-determination’ which was already visible in Suslov’s piece about the online sphere. Finally, Laruelle argues that there is a third and even more general impact which is the choice between an imperial pro-Eurasia or a xenophobic ‘Russian World’ vision (Laruelle 2015, 119.). Still, the main turning point according Laine was the change in the behaviour of the state who previously more or less behaved tolerantly to the less significant nationalist movements, but after Crimea the state explicitly challenged this shared space, when the state started to incorporate the nationalist argument in its own agenda (Laine 2017, 233).

Since this last effect of strengthening already existing aspirations is considered to be the most significant, according to Laruelle. Russia is the biggest country of the world and its society is a multinational, multifaith, multicultural one. Therefore, the question arises whether state- supported ethnic nationalism (or even such rhetoric) could be successful and also how ethnic and other minorities responded to the annexation of Crimea. On this topic Mikhail A. Alexseev’s paper makes it clear that Putin’s turn to “ethnic Russian great-power nationalism” did not alienate ethnic minorities. According to his research, data polls prove that the annexation was supported by them about as much as the country average, moreover, both the figure measuring being proud about Russian citizenship and President Putin’s approval remained unaffected and around the country average (Alexseev 2016, 186-188.).

The fact that the Kremlin has faced practically no backlash from non-Slavic ethnic minorities in the context of Crimea is a clear example of the overarching support for the annexation shows that it was not only the various groups of blind nationalists who broadly endorsed taking the peninsula. Finally, a last example is the case of the major Russian opposition figure, Alexey Navalny, who is one of the most vocal critics of Putin’s regime, hailed by many in the West as a potentially more democratic candidate, also expressed his support for the annexation and stated that he would not return Crimea to Ukraine if he was president. Later, he slightly modified his stance, adding vaguely that he might favour a new, “fair referendum”, though without providing any details on how he would define the conditions of a ‘fair’ plebiscite (Dolgov, 2014).

The Perspective of the Kremlin on Nationalism

Switching to the perspective of the state, academic sources discuss the change in the attitude towards nationalism that the annexation of the Crimea brought. Regarding policies about nationalist movements, Laine suggests that radical movements have been and still are monitored and managed by the state, but as the nationalist rhetoric intensified along with the annexation, this got firmer since the Kremlin was no longer willing to share the said space as in the previous years (Laine 2017, 233). This was also done as a populist appeal with the intention of unifying the nation in a crisis situation which ‘rally-around-the flag’ effect is also outlined in great details in Hale’s article about patrimonial presidentialism (Hale 2016, 193)

But there is a deeper overlying dynamic behind the shift towards using more nationalism in the Kremlin’s narrative. In his article, Leon Aron presents the argument that in particular two main roles (‘wealth manager’ and ‘savior and protector of the nation’) that were previously the values associated with President Putin have lost their significance and efficiency as years of both political and economic crisis and hardships in emerged around 2011-2012 (Aron 2017, 76-79).

Losing the charms of these two values, economic growth and social stability had to be replaced and the role of the saviour reignited – by something else in order to maintain regime popularity, thus patriotic messages became the basis of Putin’s recipe for support. The increasingly more assertive behaviour on international level have also suggested that Russian foreign policy successes could also be helpful elements of the patriotic propaganda and mobilization.

Undoubtedly, the annexation of Crimea could and would fuel both pillars of the newfound narrative: a clear foreign policy success from the Kremlin’s perspective and a significant event from the point of view of ethnic Russian nationalism. In Suslov’s understanding, the official rhetoric changed in two ways almost immediately afterwards, incorporating the sacralization and the geopolitization of Crimea (for instance in Putin’s address when signing the accession treaty) similarly as in public opinion, involving “political metaphors, emotions and especially geopolitical imagination” (Suslov 2014, 589-593.).

Chasty and Whitefield discuss another aspect of this: creating a new role for Putin as the saviour of the nation. They observe that firstly, economic modernisation, a previous attribute of Putin was gone due to the stagnating economy, secondly an emerging authoritarian shift starting from the 2012 presidential elections brought nationalism as a tool for diversion (Chasty & Whitefield 2015, 157-163). While on the other hand, Elena Chebankova uses a different theoretical lens and connects the new ‘national hero’ status with the paradigmatic shift from liberal to traditional values but excluding emphasis on economic hardship. In Chebankova’s view, this traditionalist and statist discourse has been a central part of Russian history and Crimea was the symbolic fulfilment of this transition and rediscovery (Chebankova 2015, 168-170).

While in themselves these are not comprehensive explanations for the changes in Kremlin’s policy, the most important realization is that by 2014 nationalism has been incorporated in the official Kremlin agenda, but it is far from being solely Russian-centric and it also continued the ambiguity of previous Kremlin policies.

And this leads to a key characteristic about nationalism in Russia: the undecided issue of clear definitions. Notably, there are five policy options for defining the Russian nation and all five of them have quite salient disadvantages. Oxana Shivel has written in a detailed manner on the nation-building agenda since the collapse of the Soviet Union. She introduces how nation building policies are generally categorized, either from an ethnic (‘Russkii’; based on ethno- cultural background, religion, language) or from a civic perspective (‘Rossiiskii’; based on loyalty to the state and its institutions) and elaborates on the five possible typologies in the case of Russia with their advantages and weaknesses (Shivel 2011, 181-189).

Shivel’s research summarizes the five potential definitions of a ‘Russian nation’: based on current state territory, nation as ethnic Russians, an Orthodox Eastern Slavic nation, a Russian- speaking linguistical nation and a nation defined by the territory of the former Soviet Union. However, any definition aside from the one based on current state territory of the Russian Federation has potential irredentist projections, furthermore, the geographically ‘narrow’ definitions of ethnic Russians or Eastern Slavs distinctly threaten the territorial integrity of the current form of the multinational and multi-ethnic Russian Federation (which has struggled with separatist sentiments in the past already).

The pressing issue to choose from these alternatives was resolved by Putin with intentionally creating legal ambiguity, which though does not solve the serious contradictions of these options, but rather leaves room for manoeuvre. According to Shivel, this vagueness serves a purpose for a broader range of policies (Shivel 2011, 179).

While Shivel’s article was written in 2011, i.e. before the annexation of the Crimea so she could not connect her findings with that, however the very same ambiguity appears to occur when the official Kremlin stance uses both powerful Russian ethnic nationalist messages while parallelly keeping the terminology such as ‘compatriot’ which has ground in the civic nation building agenda. Highlighting the same argument, Hutchings notes that the official wording in case of Crimea also preferred to use the word ‘compatriots’, not referring to them as ethnic Russians or Russian-speakers since that would not be entirely true, even though ethnic Russians were in majority in Crimea and predominantly Russian-speakers were the significant majority. (Hutchings 2015, 180).

In essence, alongside the standard view of civic nationalism in which the ethnic and other minorities and national identities were incorporated into the Russian Federation on the grounds of Russian citizenship, a new emerging narrative can be observed which puts forward nationalist sentiments in a country where Russian nationalism is yet to be definitively defined. Yet, in the case of the Crimea we have seen that even though the annexation played well into this narrative, it was similarly well received by other societal groups, too.

Conclusion and Outlook

The paper aimed to explore and analyse academic discussion regarding the annexation of Crimea and its relationship with nationalism by showing how Crimea was indeed a major turning point concerning Russian nationalism and identity for several reasons. Firstly, through strengthening new aspirations of nationalist movements’ geopolitical visions, however, also further weakening these existing but divided groups, because the Kremlin began to incorporate nationalist and patriotic propaganda more in the official agenda.

Furthermore, the paper also pointed out that propaganda was drawing heavily from Russian ethnic great power ambitions which was not championed by state so far due to a delicate demographic situation, where previously legal ambiguity was the official approach. The work cited how the annexation of Crimea was universally supported, including non-Slavic minorities and opposition figures and

In this additional chapter, two interesting new topics are mentioned which could be potential subjects of further analysis in the future.

Firstly, expanding the scope to include Ukraine. Reiterating the abovementioned notion by Kuzio that conflicts transform national identities and attitudes of countries (Kuzio 2015, 157.), a close look at the political orientation and general discourse in Ukraine seemingly underlines that apt description on the relationship between itself and Russia that ‘Russia won Crimea but lost Ukraine’. Therefore, the three points (pro-Russian sentiment, Ukrainian patriotism and nationalism) mentioned by Kuzio could be a basis for further research how the events in Crimea and Donbas brought change in Ukraine’s political orientation and Ukrainians’ general attitudes towards their country and its geopolitical situation.

Secondly, focusing more on Donbas. Clearly, Crimea and Donbas differ in many aspects, but one which is particularly close to this paper’s focus is that the war in Donbas proved to be a much more divisive issue in Russia than Crimea, since the Kremlin’s position is more obscure. Research could be started by examining Kremlin’s stance towards three ideological motifs about the region outlined by Marlene Laruelle (Laruelle 2016, 57-70.): red (emphasizing the memory of the USSR, focusing on the great power status of Russia), white (the role of Orthodox Christianity) and brown (neo-fascist elements, idea of ‘exporting’ national revolution to Russia).