Violent Christian Conversions In Russia'S Coercive History
Paul W. Werth (2003) in his article “Coercion and Conversion: Violence and the Mass Baptism of the Volga Peoples, 1740-55” attempts to dispute the authorization of violence by state during the dawn of missionary campaign that took place in Russian Empire in the middle of the eighteenth century. In doing so, he analyzes the sources from which missionary impulses originated and institutional foundation of mass baptism.
According to the author, his goal in writing this article was to reconsider the image of state’s participation in managing the conversion of non-russian subjects to orthodox christianity that on many instances acquired a violent character. Notably, the author does not exclude the instances of coercion, he rather highlights that neither the central government nor the Orthodox Church authorized the use of force in order to coerce converts. In principle, their desire was to ensure conviction of non-russians to christianity that required some basic knowledge of orthodogs dogmas.
Wreth’s central argument suggests that the major catalyst for mass baptism and key to its numeric success during the year of 1740 until 1755 was in creation of the set of incentives for non-christians to voluntarily convert to christianity rather than the use of force to fulfil the given mission. These incentives were material in nature as they implied various levels of tax reliefs and financial rewards for being converted.
According to the author, the latter incentive may stand as an explanation for the success is high number of converts during 1740-1755. Though such incentives proved to be successful in motivating non-christians to convert, a number of negative incentives were introduced by the local officials in regional areas as well. These included deprival of titles from non-russian aristocrats and increase of tax burden for non-converts.
As for the atrocities targeted at non-christians, the author connects the instances of violent baptism to state’s central apparatus’ inability to control the implementation of missionary campaign on a regional level. This point does not sound groundless if we consider the extensive territory and large number of subjects that make it difficult for a state to exercise effective management over its possessions.
Since Russian Empire’s subordinate regions exercised autonomy over their self-management, Werth deduces that atrocities related to conversion of non-christians were motivated either by missionary zeal of some local officials or their desire to enrich through the exploitation of converts. Moreover, the author states that in fact, violence towards non-russians began to take place following the conversion rather than before the procedure per se.
Another piece of evidence to reinforce authors scepticism towards state sanctioned violent baptism suggests that St.Petersburg attempted to undertake measures in order to protect its non-russian subjects from forceful conversion. In particular, central government demanded the return of stolen possessions to converted non-russian subjects and prosecuted officials when they get caught in abuse of their power. Yet, there is not enough evidence to assert that actions taken by the government to ensure the security of non-converts were effective in achieving its goal as it was difficult to detect and target violators.
Werth claims that although central government could not adequately manage the implementation of the initiative on conversion, it still had a capacity to start or end the program. Yet, considering the state intention to ensure voluntary conversion to Orthodox Christianity of its non-russian subjects it is not clear why it had not terminated its missionary campaign when the cases of violent baptism started to take place. The author provides three explanations for central apparatus’ tolerance for violent baptism. First, he suggests that once conversion of a person happened it cannot be reversed. Second, clergy regarded baptism as an initial point in total conversion to christianity rather than the final. These two explanations fail to clarify state’s passivity in the fight against forced conversion to Christianity. Nevertheless, the third explanation sounds more convincing as it suggests that as a growing number of subordinates exercise officially recognized form of religion it contributes to an effective management of an increasing bureaucratic state.
In conclusion, ideas presented in this article mirrors the authors attempt to contextualize the cases of violence that took place during the campaign of mass conversion to Orthodox Christianity of non-russian subjects in Russian Empire in the period of 1740 to 1755, and to deviate from the rhetoric adopted by numerous historians suggesting that the use of force was initiated by central apparatus as an integral part of the missionary program.
Furthermore, he suggested that state even attempted to protect non-converts from local authorities who abuse their power to coerce them. The author shed light on an inefficient institutional management in Russian Empire and provided a more detailed explanation to the dynamics in state’s confessional landscape that was systematically taking a violent character.
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