The Implementation of Peace with Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It requires the explicit authorization of the Security Council.

It is used to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has decided to act in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority and in accordance with the UN Charter.

Unlike peacekeeping, the concept of peace enforcement had its explicit origins in the UN Charter under Chapter VII, as noted above.

Security Council authority to use force under the Charter has been primarily limited to two different types of collective uses of force: enforcement actions and humanitarian interventions.

In November 1990, the Security Council authorized a coalition of willing states to take enforcement action against Iraq. Resolution 678 called on these states to use 'all necessary means' to liberate Kuwait from Iraqiaggression.62 The resolution stated that the Council was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, though it did not state which provision. Article 51 of Chapter VII fit the situation and perhaps made most sense. 63 Iraq had invaded Kuwait, thus Kuwait could respond in individual or collective self-defence. The Security Council could take over the defence of a victim state, like Kuwait, but presumably if it did so and sent or authorized troops, it would be acting under Article 42. Yet, to act under Article 42, the Council would need agreements with states for providing troops, and the United Nations would need to be in command, as contemplated in Article 43.64 Operation Desert Storm, on the contrary, was under US command. The Security Council simply avoided the obvious questions by citing only Chapter VII and no specific article. Following the Gulf War, the Security Council used the same formulation of calling on states to use all necessary means in authorizing operations not involving collective self-defence and without Article 43 agreements. These authorizations have not been criticized by the international community; they have mostly been praised. In addition, this practice of vaguely referring to Chapter VII was not the first innovation by the United Nations in the area of peace and security-that was the development of peacekeeping.

Similarly, despite the facial applicability of Chapter VIII to the tasks of regional security arrangements beyond collective self-defence, shifting to authorization under Chapter VII has passed without much notice. unlawful. The examples of expanded Chapter VII authorization, including peacekeeping and authorization of regional organizations, are arguably lawful modifications of a treaty through practice. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that the interpretation of a treaty may be influenced by practice.

Some scholars, especially in the United States, have argued for a right of humanitarian intervention, meaning a right to take offensive military action without Security Council authorization to protect human rights. No treaty permits humanitarian intervention. Nor is there much, if any, real evidence of a general practice followed out of a sense of legal obligation to support a right of humanitarian intervention under customary law. until the Kosovo crisis, no government has argued in favor of a right of unauthorized humanitarian intervention.

The 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution, however, did not change the Charter scheme.83 The General Assembly may only recommend military action when states would otherwise have the right to take such action absent a Security Council resolution. The General Assembly can recommend collective self-defence when a state is the victim of an armed attack. Yet, for other breaches of or threats to the peace, the General Assembly arguably cannot recommend the use of armed force for enforcement purposes. In addition to claiming a right of humanitarian intervention, some have also argued that NATO's use of force in Kosovo can be excused. An act that violates the law may in some cases be excused if the violator has a defence.

The UN International Law Commission (ILC) in its Draft Articles on State Responsibility has found six general defences in international law that may excuse a wrong in whole or in part: consent, countermeasures, force majeure, distress, state of necessity, and self-defense.85 Many NATO members invoked the concept of necessity during the Kosovo crisis to justify using force without Security Council authorization.6 The defence of necessity as drafted by the ILC, however, would appear unlikely to excuse an unlawful use of force. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act of that State that is not in conformity with an international obligation of the State unless: a. the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State against a grave and imminent peril; and b. the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards which the obligation existed. The ILC does not include the use of military force in its examples of the defence of distress, the defence of distress aims at excusing those violations where time is of the essence and a violator would not have the time or opportunity to act otherwise-such as getting a Security Council authorization first.

Western militaries, while also using divergent terms, have moved towards a shared conceptualization of peace enforcement. The conservative military reaction to the idea of peace enforcement—that it was synonymous with ‘war- fighting’—has been discredited. Since the end of the cold war the major Western militaries have adopted some form of peace enforcement doctrine. Western peace enforcement doctrine has been on display in several missions, including INTERFET, Opération Turquoise, IFOR, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

The generally shared concept of peace enforcement appears to be that it aims to ensure the implementation of a peace agreement or arrangement (such as a ceasefire), including compliance by all parties with their undertakings, through the judicious application of incentives and disincentives, among them the robust use of force. Any use of force will be closely calibrated with political action, hopefully at the highest level, that of the UN Security Council. While peace enforcement may sound like a military strategy, in essence it must be political, with the military playing a supporting role involving deterrence and compelence as necessary.

A peace enforcement operation may take place in the context of a comprehensive political strategy which may include all or most of the following elements: a ceasefire; the withdrawal and/cantonment of forces; the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of soldiers into civil society; the establishment or re-establishment of democratic governance; the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons; humanitarian assistance; the inculcation and protection of human rights; action on landmines; the re-establishment of a judicial system and a civilian police force; encouragement of the growth of civil society; and quick-impact development projects in conjunction with longer-term economic reconstruction and development.

Unlike in peacekeeping, the threat of force and the use of force beyond self-defence are key instruments in the ‘tool box’ of a peace enforcement operaation—although the more impressive the capabilities for using force appear to be to the former belligerents, the less likely they are to be employed. The requirement for the use of force is likely to be high at the beginning of an operation but taper off as the peace settlement takes hold. As in peacekeeping, the degree of consent to or acquiescence in the deployment and operation of a peace enforcement mission that is obtainable from the local parties will be a key consideration.