Joint Function Flaws During Operation Anaconda

Introduction

On September 11, 2001, the United States came under attack by the Islamic group, al-Qaeda, in the form of hi-jacked airplanes that crashed into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. This was the biggest terrorist attack on the United States since Pearl Harbor and changed the course of history. In response, the United States sent forces into Afghanistan, which led to the actions that became Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda was an elaborate plan with the goal of destroying al-Qaeda leaders and violent Taliban forces. It was supposed to be a swift and smooth operation, only meant to last for three days; however, Operation Anaconda surpassed its original timeline because of mistakes and flaws in applying joint functions. Operation Anaconda lasted more than two weeks because of confusion in Command and Control (C2) and inconsistent intelligence and information.

Command and Control Confusion

The joint function of command and control leading up to and during the execution of Operation Anaconda was not up to standard. One of the big problems that set the tone was bad communication practices that were in place prior to Operation Anaconda. Due to the heavy focus on Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander had the habit of communicating straight with the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Commanders, going over the head, and skipping any communications with the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003). This kind of relationship contradicts National Theater Command Structure (JP 3-05, 2014) and is comparable to a Brigade Commander speaking directly to a Company Commander about their operations instead of communicating through his Battalion Commander. As the day for Anaconda was drawing closer, TF Mountain, commanded by Major General Hagenbeck, was designated as a joint task force and became CJTF Mountain on 13 February 2002, just over two weeks prior to the planned execution date. Once this change took place, MG Hagenbeck decided he had to move his staff and headquarters from their base in Uzbekistan to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan so he could have, ironically, better command and control over the operation.

CJTF Mountain’s move to Bagram was complete on 20 February, which was the same day that the operations order for Operation Anaconda came down through the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). This left little time to prepare and plan for the execution of Operation Anaconda. Making matters worse, MG Hagenbeck only had about half of his original staff and neither his assistant or deputy commander with him. Eventually, CJTF Mountain was augmented with additional personnel from other units, but this left gaps in continuity (Kugler, 2007).

Although MG Hagenbeck was identified as the commander for Operation Anaconda, he was not completely able to “command [all] subordinate forces, prioritize and allocate resources or communicate and ensure the flow of information” (JP 3-0, 2018) because of the preceding circumstances. CJTF Mountain did not have command over Black SOF Forces (TF 11) or the Friendly Afghan forces, both of which played a key role in the operation. There was also confusion as to who had tactical control (TACON) over the air assets supporting Operation Anaconda, which did not get worked out until the actual the operation was under way.

Intelligence and Information

The joint function of intelligence and information deemed to be problematic throughout Operation Anaconda. To start with, CJTF Mountain made some bad assumptions on the operational environment. They assumed that the Afghan forces would retreat once they were attacked. On the contrary, Afghan forces were well prepared and willing to fight back fiercely. This could have been due to a possible center of gravity in the form of a network of caves that was overlooked in the intelligence analysis. These caves were a location that CJTF Mountain opted not to conduct pre-infiltration airstrikes for two reasons: fear that Afghan forces would escape because of early airstrikes and to preserve the caves and any documents that were possibly there to be used against the enemy. That reasoning proved to be wrong. The caves were actually a stronghold for the enemy that served as a storehouse for ammunition and weapons as well as a defensive position to fight in.

There was also the severe underestimation of the actual Afghan enemy forces in the area. “The initial threat assessment had anticipated only some 150 to 200 al Qaeda combatants in the area, a number that soared to between 600 and 700 after the first two days of combat” (Lambeth, 2005, pg. 192). These false initial reports of projected enemy in the area came fruition for several reasons. One being that

References

1. Department of Defense. (2018). Joint Operations (JP 3-0). Retrieved from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf
2. Department of Defense. (2014). Special Operations (JP 3-05). Retrieved from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf
3. Fleri, E., Howard, E., Hukill, J., & Searle, T. (2013). Operation Anaconda Case Study. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Headquarters, United States Air Force. (2005). Operation Anaconda, an Air Power Perspective. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2014/Sep/17/2001329845/-1/-1/0/anaconda%20ADA495248.pdf
4. Kugler, R. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle. Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/136788/Case%205%20Opera tion%20Anaconda.pdf
5. Lambeth, B. (2005). Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation